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Recognizing the "Bad Barrel" in
Public Business Firms:
Social and Organizational Factors in
Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers
JAMES A. FANTOt
INTRODUCTION

This Article examines an important and current issue
with respect to the law of large public firms: the law's
failure to recognize the importance of group and
organizational factors in senior-level misconduct within the
firm. These firms are complex organizations, which are
composed of subsidiaries, divisions, and subdivisions in the
organizational hierarchy.' The subdivisions are, in turn,
made up of groups and teams of individuals who work
within them. Under U.S. business practice, individuals are
responsible for decisions at every level of the business and,
as is characteristic of U.S. public companies, a chief
executive officer (CEO), who is also usually the chair of the
board of directors, sits at the apex of a typical firm's

t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank my colleagues
Miriam Baer, Dana Brakman Reiser, Roberta Karmel, James Park, and Arthur
Pinto for their comments on this Article.
1. For the classic account of the structure of large, multi-dimensional
business firms, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. WITH TAKASHI HIKINO, SCALE AND
SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 31-34 (1990).
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hierarchy. 2 Yet, at the highest level of the public firm, a
group of individuals, the board of directors or similar
governing body, is ultimately responsible for supervising
the firm and is encouraged-and indeed mandated-to
make collective, major decisions with respect to specific
strategic issues and to ensure that an adequate supervisory
system for the firm is in place. 3 Although it is recognized
that the CEO, not the board, establishes the strategy for
and directs the operation of the firm, which the board is
asked to approve, he or she does not do this alone, but with
a team of senior executives, who are themselves assisted by
subordinate executives. 4 Moreover, directors and executives
make their decisions or perform their actions using existing
practices and perspectives-in short, an organizational
culture-that have been developed over time in the firm. 5
In sum, groups and organizations matter for the conduct of
senior decision-makers in the legal and business reality of
the large public corporations.
When, however, a serious scandal arises from
misconduct by these directors and senior executives, the
law downplays or even ignores the group and
organizational factors in the misconduct. The legal analysis
of the problem generally focuses on the individual(s)
concerned, whether directors or executives, and regulators
or the courts then punish him or her (or them). Any group
in which the targeted individual worked is recognized by
the law only as a collection of other individuals who, as
such, may also have participated in the misconduct and
violated their legal duties, and are thus deserving of
censure. The law does punish an organization in some
cases. Under the agency and tort law doctrine of respondeat
superior, a business organization may be liable for the
misconduct of its agent acting in the scope of employment
or for the benefit of the organization. 6 This doctrine is also
used to make a business organization criminally liable if
2. See SPENCER STUART, BOARD INDEX 17 (2007) (noting that sixty-five

percent of S&P 500 companies had a combined Chair/CEO in 2007).
3. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b), at 8-3 (2008).
4. For a review of the organizational literature on management teams, see
JEFFREY PFEFFER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY 89-93 (1997).

5. Id. at 121.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
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one of its agents commits a crime within the firm. 7 The
is an example of
well-known case of Arthur Andersen
8
organizational criminal liability.
The
emphasis
upon
individual
liability
and
punishment, with little consideration for group and
organizational factors, has several results. The targeted
individual director or officer may be found civilly liable, and
may even be criminally prosecuted and convicted. However,
he or she is also being punished for any group or
organizational contribution to the problem, unless the law
punishes the group or organization-which rarely occurs.
This outcome is inequitable, for an individual should not be
punished for a group or organizational failing. It also raises
a practical issue: if group or organizational influences on
individual misconduct are significant, leaving them
unaddressed may lead to more misconduct by those within
a business firm, and even by business firms in general. By
contrast, group or organizational liability raises its own
equitable and practical problems. For example, to make a
group or organization liable may mean that its members
with little or no involvement in the misconduct are swept
within the liability or punishment, which is not only
inequitable but also has its own adverse practical
consequences (e.g., individuals feel that the law is
irrational). These concerns also surfaced in the Arthur
Andersen prosecution, where it was generally perceived
that many innocent employees suffered when the firm
failed as a result of its criminal conviction. 9
It is important to be clear here. There is no question
that misconduct by a senior decision-maker has much to do
with the personal failings of that individual. Generally, the
individual director or executive who commits misconduct
may exhibit a flawed moral development by pursuing his or
her own self-interest in violation of ethical, social, and legal
7. See infra note 149.
8. Actually, this accounting firm was criminally prosecuted for obstruction
of justice because of its employees' destruction of documents relating to its
participation in Enron's fraud. Its conviction, however, was overturned by the
U.S. Supreme Court. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696
(2005); see also infra note 152.
9. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Kiement, Deterrence and the Corporate

Death Penalty 2 (Dec. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1024698.
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norms. Yet, groups and organizations can facilitate or
exacerbate this misconduct, for example, by encouraging an
individual to pursue his or her own self-interest and to
ignore other norms. Indeed, as will be discussed further
below, business and even law schools have undermined the
moral development of executives because they have based
their training on an impoverished model of a human being,
the calculating self-interested individual, and this model
has encouraged executives to act in ways compatible with
it. Groups and organizations can equally act as a check on
individuals who might be prone to misconduct by
preventing persons from joining the organization in the first
place, by resisting their pursuit of self-interest through
promoting other norms and models of conduct, and by
punishing misconduct. Groups and organizations are thus
critical because they can either promote and magnify the
misconduct, or prevent it or reduce its effects.
The purpose of this Article is to explore and support the
contention that laws dealing with business associations do
not adequately address the group and organizational role in
the misconduct by senior decision-makers in public firms, to
discuss the reasons for this failing, and to propose reforms
to the current state of affairs. In order to undertake the
above exploration, this Article provides background on
group and organizational causes of or factors in misconduct
by senior decision-makers in business firms and on the
relationship of these causes to individual elements. The
background is based upon the academic disciplines that
have explored these issues and questions, chiefly social
psychology and organizational
studies. 10 Since the
literature here is voluminous, the review of the literature is
conducted only to present scholarly evidence on how groups

10. See infraPart I.
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and organizations contribute to certain kinds of misconduct
occurring at the upper level of business organizations. 1
Moreover, because the laws affecting these decisionmakers are numerous and ever-growing, the examination of
them is quite focused. Corporate law is reviewed because it
establishes the decision-making structure of the firm and
the duties of directors and executives, and it is the
12
foundation upon which all other relevant laws build.
Federal securities laws must be considered because they
are also important in the governance of public companies,
and because their violation is the basis for the significant
punishment of senior decision-makers through enforcement
actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and federal prosecutors. 13 Finally, and significantly, this
Article reviews federal criminal prosecution of senior
decision-makers, as well as the business firm itself, for
securities law violations. As will be discussed further below,
the focus here is not so much on the substance of the federal
securities laws, which allow the SEC and federal prosecutors
to pursue pretty much whomever they wish to target. 14 It is
the manner in which they pursue and prosecute individuals
and organizations that has most starkly raised the issue of
15
individual vs. group/organizational liability.

11. I have used this literature in other work. See, e.g., James Fanto,
Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering CorporateInner Circles, 83
OR. L. REV. 435, 460-72 (2004). I am not alone in these efforts. See, e.g., Donald
C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs,
Biases and OrganizationalBehavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997); Donald C.
Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002). For
papers from a symposium with this focus, see Corporate Misbehavior by Elite
Decision-Makers Symposium: Perspectives from Law and Social Psychology, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B-C.
14. To take only one example, Sarbanes-Oxley added new crimes that
sometimes overlapped with existing ones. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. V
2005) (new crime of securities fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Supp. V 2005) (new
crime of attempt and conspiracy to commit securities fraud). On the symbolic
importance of adding new crimes that essentially duplicate existing ones, see
William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 533-39 (2001) (contending that prosecutors favor new laws that increase
their discretionary powers with respect to indictment).
15. See infra Part II.C.2.
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Since the law does not take adequate account of group
and organizational causes of misconduct, this Article makes
proposals on how to address these failings. The main point
of the proposals is that the law needs to balance its current
focus on punishing the individual director or executive
engaged in misconduct with reform of the organization
where the misconduct occurred. Currently, organizational
reform occurs during enforcement actions against, or the
prosecution of, the organization for the actions of its agents.
But the reform is usually superficial, for the main goal of
the SEC and federal prosecutors is to obtain the
organization's help in identifying and punishing the
individuals directly involved in the misconduct. Seriously
addressing the group and organizational factors that
contributed to particular misconduct would require a
substantive reform that is based upon organizational and
social psychological research. Although there are limits to
what government enforcement authorities can do, their
current emphasis on individual prosecution is sending the
wrong message: that misconduct is primarily an individual
issue and, therefore, the group and organization have little
responsibility for contributing to it. This Article's proposals
suggest how lawmakers could take the organization and
group seriously and thus envision true organizational
reform.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I first reviews
representative social psychological and organizational
literature to set forth an understanding of its basic
teachings about group and organizational factors in and
causes of misconduct by senior decision-makers of public
firms. It then draws four lessons from the review. First,
social psychology and organizational studies suggest that a
group's mindset and an organization's culture can
significantly contribute to misconduct by an organization
member. Second, the literature emphasizes the significance
of the leader in perpetuating and shaping a group's mindset
and an organization's culture and thus in checking or
promoting misconduct. Third, how the group or
organization functions-in particular, whether dissent is
permitted--clearly affects whether it checks or amplifies
misconduct by its members. Fourth and finally, the group
and organization must be based upon social, ethical, and
legal foundations and cannot be sustainable if built only or
primarily upon the self-interest of its individual members.
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Part II conducts a targeted review of several legal areas
in order to see how well they take into account the group or
organizational causes of or factors in senior-level
misconduct identified above. As noted above, it considers
corporate law and the enforcement of the federal securities
laws by the SEC and federal prosecutors. The analysis of
civil and criminal enforcement of the federal securities laws
particularly focuses on organizational liability, in
conjunction or in contrast with individual liability, for
holding a public firm liable for the acts of its directors,
officers, and employees squarely raises the issue of group
and organizational causes to their misconduct. This review
of relevant laws and of their enforcement and prosecution
reveals that, by and large, group and organizational causes
or factors are given little attention in corporate law
jurisprudence and by the SEC and federal prosecutors in
securities law enforcement. In organizational parlance, the
legal emphasis is on "bad apples" rather than "bad barrels."
Part III of this Article argues that the current state of
affairs in corporate and securities law should be reformed to
reflect the group and organizational causes of and factors in
senior decision-maker misconduct. The basic argument is
that, unless the law recognizes these causes and factors,
organizational reform will be superficial and will not
address the culture and practices that contributed to the
misconduct, which will likely resurface in the organization.
Part III thus considers the possibilities of reform within the
legal areas already examined and the impediments to it,
particularly the obstacle of the self-interest ideology. Part
III further argues that organizational civil and criminal
liability must be maintained because it is societal
acknowledgement that social and organizational factors
contribute to misconduct and because it is one of the few
tools that allow society, through prosecutors and regulators,
to address group malfunctioning and pathological
organizational culture. The contention is that the current
policy of preferring deferred or non prosecution agreements
to organizational prosecution and conviction should be
continued, but that federal prosecutors should work
together with the SEC in designing these agreements to
focus more on organizational reform and should enlist social
psychologists and organizational theorists in the effort.
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REPRESENTATIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL LITERATURE

Certainly, one part of a law review article cannot
survey the entire relevant literature of social psychology
and organizational studies on group or organizational
causes of misconduct among senior decision-makers in
publicly traded companies. A comprehensive survey,
however, is not the goal here. Rather, it is to provide
enough discussion of the literature and research in social
psychology and organizational studies to convince the
reader, or to confirm what the reader already suspects,
that, when misconduct occurs in this setting, there have
usually been group or organizational causes to it or group or
organizational factors that magnify it and fail to check it.
This Part also highlights several causes and factors that the
literature considers significant.
The following discussion adopts a framework provided
by several organizational theorists. They have made the
common sense observation that there are multiple causes of
most misconduct in business organizations. 16 There are
certainly individual-level causes, such as a person's having
a predisposition to misconduct.' 7 This focus is primarily the
domain of psychology, among other fields.' 8 Since, as will be
seen below, the law sees individuals as the primary cause of
misconduct, there is no reason to dwell upon individuallevel causes, except insofar as they interact with group or

16. See Blake E. Ashforth et al., Re-Viewing OrganizationalCorruption, 33
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 670, 671-72 (2008) (pointing out the need for a more
systematic approach to organizational corruption, which would consider
interacting factors from different levels in the organization).
17. See PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 41 (discussing predispositions and
observing that the perspective on predispositions will have important policy
implications).
18. See, e.g., YOAV VARDI & ELY WEITZ, MISBEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS:

THEORY, RESEARCH, AND MANAGEMENT 126-39 (2004) (discussing the general,
empirical exploration into the cognitive and emotional determinants of
organizational misbehavior (OMB), where there is an attempt to find empirical
evidence for individual-level elements-intentions, attitudes, affect, emotionsin it).
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organizational factors. 19 Rather, the focus is on the other
factors identified by social psychologists and organizational
theorists: group and organizational causes. The former is
generally the domain of social psychology and, thus, the
discussion below of groups is based upon that literature.
The review of organizational causes naturally uses
organizational studies literature, although, since this
discipline is itself somewhat eclectic and borrows from other
disciplines, including social psychology, 20 the review of this
literature is not neatly separated from the social
psychological discussion. A final Subpart takes stock of
insights from the review, as a springboard for the analysis
of the law's failings.
A. Groups in Social Psychology
1. Some
Social
Psychological Basics.
Social
psychological literature points out the obvious fact that, as
human beings, we are social beings and actually need to
form groups in most contexts of our daily lives. 21 According
to one social psychological theory-social identity theorygroups help give their members a place in society, a social
role, and value, which the social side of our nature
demands. 22 Under this theory, a person needs a social
identity or identities for self-esteem, and groups provide
that identification. 23 This naturally requires that a person
embraces, and is embraced by, a given group. A group also
provides its members with a "mindset" and patterns of
conduct-including with respect to other groups-which are
necessary in a world characterized by uncertainty, diverse

19. There is a rich literature on individual-level biases and cognitive errors
that can lead to poor individual decision-making, but this is not the focus of this
Article, although it has been the focus of other articles I have written. See, e.g.,

James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationalityin Action: A Study of Psychological Factors
in MergerDecision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1341-47 (2001).
20. See PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 16-17 (discussing methodological diversity
in organizational studies).
21. See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 551 (2d ed. 1986).

22. See Michael A. Hogg, A Social Identity Theory of Leadership, 5
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 184, 186-87 (2001).
23. Id.
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groups, and social relationships. 24 The group mindset is
created through the contributions of past and present group
members. While in a group, an individual is not the person
he or she was before (or is in other groups), because his or
her self-conception, viewpoints, and conduct are based upon
and formed by a conceptual model that he or she learns
from the group. 25 Of course, an individual must be
socialized into the group and must learn its patterns of
thinking and conduct. This happens from his or her
interactions with group members.
Under social identity theory, a group leader has a
special importance in the group. 26 The leader occupies this
role because he or she appears to be closest to the group's
"ideal." Given this special status, the leader can move the
group to adopt new perspectives and patterns of conduct,
but within limits: a good leader anticipates where the group
is ready to go. Because other group members think and
decide on the basis of their self-identification with the group
and their desire to situate themselves favorably within the
group, they generally wish to be well regarded by and close
to the leader. 27 Moreover, a leader helps maintain and
establish group dynamics that allow his or her group to
function properly in all kinds of ways, such as dealing with
changes in the group's environment and ensuring that the
group fits into larger society.

24. See Michael A. Hogg & Barbara-A. Mullin, Joining Groups to Reduce
Uncertainty: Subjective Uncertainty Reduction and Group Identification, in
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 249, 250-55 (Dominic Abrams & Michael
A. Hogg eds., 1999).
25. This is referred to in the literature as "depersonalization" of the
individual as he or she becomes a group member. See id. at 254; see also
Dominic Abrams, Social Identity, Social Cognition, and the Self The Flexibility
and Stability of Self-Categorization,in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION,
supra note 24, at 197; Deborah J. Terry et al., Group Membership, Social
Identity, and Attitudes, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note
24, at 280, 284.

26. See S.

ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL

IDENTITY APPROACH

40-59 (2d ed. 2004).

27. This latter process is called "social comparison" in the literature. See

supra note 26, at 283; James H. Davis, Some Compelling Intuitions
About Group Consensus Decisions, Theoretical and Empirical Research, and
InterpersonalAggregation Phenomena: Selected Examples, 1950-1990, 52 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 3, 12-13 (1992).
HASLAM,
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2. Misconduct in Social Psychological Terms. What,
then, from the above suggests how a group can be a cause of
or factor in misconduct by senior decision-makers? An
obvious answer is that the group may become corrupt
because its leader is corrupt. A corrupt Chairman/CEO or
another senior executive may lead the board or a group of
executives into misconduct, or into an acquiescence of
misconduct. 28 Here, the group simply amplifies the
misconduct that the leader initiates. 29 For example, the
leader adopts a perspective that slightly twists an
acceptable business goal (e.g., it is important to meet
earnings expectations at all costs in order to satisfy
shareholders) and directs unethical or illegal ways of
achieving them. 30 This perspective becomes that of the
group through the social identity process. As will be
discussed below, the law generally adopts this answer,
seeing group corruption as due to the failings of an
individual.
Group members are socialized into misconduct and the
perspective that justifies it. According to another social
psychological theory-social processing theory-individuals
look for signs of what are acceptable attitudes and conduct
in groups. 31 Misconduct by co-members, and particularly by
a leader, signals that it is allowed, and even the norm, in an
28. See generally John M. Darley, How OrganizationsSocialize Individuals
into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS
ETHICS 13 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
29. See VARDI & WEITZ, supra note 18, at 81-82.
30. A good example is the scandal about stock option backdating. The
"acceptable" perspective might be: The company needs to attract new
employees, and to keep existing high performers, at all costs so as to maintain
its industry position. An executive then gives the order to backdate an option
grant to a new employee or an existing one so that an employee receives a
guaranteed bonus upon the receipt of options (i.e., they are immediately "in the
money"). The action is justified as in keeping with the perspective, and it is
further supported because it is an industry practice. But, it produces misleading
financial statements because the company fails to recognize on them a
compensation expense (i.e., the "in the money" amount for the recipient of the
option). For a general discussion of backdating, see SUNIL PANIKKATH, NERA
ECONOMIC CONSULTING, OPTIONS BACKDATING: A PRIMER (Oct. 5, 2006),
http://www.nera.com/image/PUBBackdatingPartlPrimerSEC1381_final.p

df.
31. See Merideth Ferguson, From Bad to Worse: A Social Contagion Model
of Organizational Misbehavior *6 (July 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=915945.
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enterprise. If, moreover, individuals in a group engage in
misconduct, it is more likely that new members of the
organization will do the same-or quickly depart-and a
spiral of misconduct occurs. 32 Furthermore, social cohesion,
a group attribute that is measured by the frequency of
interactions
among members,
amplifies a group's
misconduct. 33 The above suggests that, however the
misconduct is instigated, whether through a current or past
leader or another group member, it takes on a life of its own
through the group, which magnifies it.
The origins of misconduct among senior executives are
often more complicated than a leader's predisposition to it.
Individuals with similar predispositions and values are
drawn together into groups in business organizations in the
first place, even if their values ultimately prove harmful to
the organization and to larger society. 34 This has been
shown to be the case in business organizations at lower
levels than the executive level, and there is some evidence
for it in the corporate scandals at the senior level as well.
Indeed, the world views of many senior business decisionmakers are similar. 35 It is well established by business
school academics that business schools, the preparers of
executives and financial professionals, have for years
espoused a toxic view of human beings as being mainly selfinterested profit maximizers. 36 Executives have been taught
to base their thinking and conduct upon this model, which
relegates other standards or models to a secondary position
in their business activities. When individuals formed in this
way come together, they may engage in schemes of mutual
self-enrichment, even if their actions ultimately destroy

32. See id. at * 11.
33. See id. at *14.
34. See VARDI & WEITZ, supra note 18, at 41.

35. Cf. Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives:
Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?, 45 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 293, 320-24 (2000).
36. The seminal article from this perspective is Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad

Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices, 4 ACAD.
MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75, 76-77 (2005). See also Dennis A. Gioia, Business
Education's Role in the Crisis of Corporate Confidence, 16 ACAD. MGMT.
EXECUTIVE 142, 143 (2002) (explaining that ethical training has been
marginalized in business schools, which has coincided with the increasing
dominance of economics in these institutions).
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their business firm and their careers.37 While the cause of
the misconduct here is at first glance individual, it is in fact
organizational, insofar as institutions (schools) helped to
form the individuals, and social, insofar as a group of likeminded others reinforces an individual's predispositions.
Group processes thus amplify, or restrain, misconduct.
In the classic account of perverse group dynamics, known as
"groupthink," social theorist Irving Janis examined
dysfunctional groups at the highest levels of political
decision-making. 38 According to this account, group
members adhere so strongly and confidently to the group's
perspective-they become almost pathologically cohesivethat they shut out opposing viewpoints and the learning
37. See VARDI & WEITZ, supra note 18, at 40-41. There are certainly
numerous examples of this from the corporate scandals. This model explains
the situation in Enron, where a major criterion for being an executive was
single-minded self-interest and where the collective pursuit of it led the firm to
disaster. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuYS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2004). Of course,
organizational misconduct may be related to one's "disidentification" with an
organization (rather than identification with it), if one feels that the
organization's values do not correspond with those of the individual (e.g.,
sabotaging a firm whose products one thinks are harmful). See, e.g., Li Ma et
al., Being the Same and Being the Different Simultaneously: Identifying (or
not) with the Organization 22 (Feb. 14, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=913975.
38. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 174-77 (2d ed. 1983). Groupthink is by no means a
theory accepted in all its aspects in social psychology and organizational
studies. But, it is clearly viewed as a useful perspective, although in need of
refinement and testing. See James K. Esser, Alive and Well after 25 Years: A
Review of Groupthink Research, 73 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES
116 (1998); Paul B. Paulus, Developing Consensus About Groupthink After All
These Years, 73 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 362, 370-71 (1998).
But see Sally Riggs Fuller & Ramon J. Aldag, Organizational Tonypandy:
Lessons from a Quarter Century of the Groupthink Phenomenon, 73 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 163 (1998) (criticizing the theory as erroneous,
without empirical support, and simplifying complex group processes). There is
continuing debate as to the origins of groupthink. Janis thought that it came
from the high cohesion of the group arising from personal attraction of the
members and an esprit de corps, as opposed to group prestige (i.e., members did
not want to offend other members because of their personal bonds). JANIS,
supra, at 245. He reasoned that groups perform better when members care
about reaching the best decision and about having a group with successful
decisions, rather than pleasing other group members. Id. at 245-50. For some,
groupthink is a group's response to dealing with uncertainty. See Clark
McCauley, Group Dynamics in Janis's Theory of Groupthink: Backward and
Forward,73 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 142, 147 (1998).
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that comes from the experience of challenges to their
perspectives. The members discipline themselves, allowing
no real dissent within the group and regarding outsiders
with scorn. 39 A group under the sway of groupthink is
generally hierarchical. This means that the leader is
autocratic as to decisions (rather than being open to
discussion) and actions, and enforces his or her
unquestioned authority that prevents other, contrasting
viewpoints ("cognitive conflict") from emerging. 40
Groupthink can arise in any kind of group and does not
necessarily lead to misconduct. 41 However, if a perspective
condoning misconduct is part of the group's mindset, and if
group members begin to engage in some misconduct,
groupthink in the group, together with the other social
processes discussed above, can magnify the misconduct
unchallenged. 42 No viewpoint that would reveal the

39. See JANIS, supra note 38, at 242-59. I say "real" dissent because, even in
a group characterized by groupthink, members may appoint a "token" dissenter
whose role it is to be critical of the group, but who never seriously challenges
the group's perspective and whose existence gives the group an illusion of
openness to outside viewpoints. See id. at 114-17. In the classical account, there
are seen to be eight symptoms of groupthink: illusion of invulnerability,
collective rationalization, belief in moral superiority, outgroup stereotyping,
pressure on dissenters, self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, and selfappointed mindguards. See id. at 256-59.
40. See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: UnderstandingBoards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making
Groups, 24 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 499 (1999). Among those who have studied
the groupthink model, some have found that the role of leadership is more
nuanced. That is, a strong leader is not necessarily a negative factor for a group
to have successful decision-making, so long as the leader is open to dissent.
However, an absolute leader who comes to typify the organization can be
significant in poor decision quality. See Randall S. Peterson et al., Group
Dynamics in Top Management Teams: Groupthink, Vigilance, and Alternative
Models of Organizational Failure and Success, 73 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 272, 291-92 (1998).

41. One can think of examples, as did Janis himself, from political decisionmaking (e.g., decision to invade Iraq) or simply from politics (e.g., CBS's airing
of an erroneous program on George Bush's Texas National Guard service). See
DICK THORNBURGH & LouIs D. BOCCARDI, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
PANEL ON THE SEPTEMBER 8, 2004 60 MINUTES WEDNESDAY SEGMENT "FOR THE
RECORD" CONCERNING PRESIDENT BUSH'S TEXAS AIR NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE

211-16 (Jan. 5, 2005). All political parties are prone to groupthink.
42. For a discussion of the links between groupthink and unethical behavior
in organizations, see Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to Unethical Behavior
in Organizations, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 651 (1992). Sims argues that groupthink
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misconduct is allowed, for loyalty to the group trumps
loyalty to alternative social values, and so the misconduct
can lead to even greater misconduct. 43 Group members
become overconfident (and unrealistic) in their ability to
continue with the misconduct without detection. 44 For
example, an executive group decides to anticipate sales
from the next quarter to make the earnings numbers in this
quarter, on the basis that making the numbers (rather than
presenting an accurate view of the firm's results) and
ensuring their own bonuses matter most in the short term.
The process continues into the next quarter, as it must
since sales have been taken from it, and so on until the
entire scheme collapses, leading to the firm's demise, a
result way out of proportion to the initial decision, but
certainly predictable from an external perspective.
Of course, groups can restrain misconduct. Certainly,
executive groups could have ethical leaders and mindsets
based upon norms other than self-interest, although this
would be rare in U.S. business today. In addition, Janis

leads to misconduct when a business group adopts a "bottom-line mentality,"
when the group leaders support it and unethical practices that are profitable,
and when there is no cognitive conflict in the group. See id. at 653-58.
Groupthink has been explained in terms of social identity theory: a group's
existence and identity is threatened, which causes the group to expend its
resources in shoring up its social identity, rather than in making good decisions.
See Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, A Social Identity Maintenance
Model of Groupthink, 73 ORG. BEHAV. & Hum.DECISION PROCESSES 210, 220-21
(1998). These authors suggest that, because of the social identity bases for
groupthink, one must be careful about easy solutions to groupthink in a
particular group, for if the group is threatened by proposed reforms, it may
react negatively to, or ignore, them. Id. at 222-24.
43. For a discussion of this process, see Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring:

The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 71, 89-90 (2002). Indeed, if the "norm" of the group becomes a kind
of misconduct, group members try to equal or even exceed this norm, which
leads to even greater misconduct. See Bertram H. Raven, Groupthink, Bay of
Pigs, and Watergate Reconsidered, 73 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
352, 357 (1998).

44. See Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and
Perpetuationof Corruption in Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 9, 1114 (2005) (listing rationalizations). From this perspective, a group engaged in
misconduct provides a "social cocoon" for its members so that they isolate
themselves from the outside world in their deviant practices. See id. at 16.
Individuals compartmentalize their behavior when they are at work and do not
consider it from the perspective of other "selves" that they might embrace
outside work. Id.
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offers several group processes that help a group avoid
groupthink, such as having a leader allow free discussion of
group action without signaling too early his or her own
views. 45 This discussion of group dynamics is deferred to
the account of organizational theory below, since the latter
specifically deals with processes useful in countering
misconduct.
B. OrganizationalTheory
1. Misconduct from the Perspective of Organizational
Theory. Since, as noted above, organizational literature
does not provide only one approach to the study of
organizations, but incorporates theories from other
disciplines, including social psychology, the discussion
about organizational theory's insights into misconduct
among senior decision-makers in business firms is related
to the preceding social psychological review. Misconduct in
organizations has not always been a subject of sustained
interest in organizational studies. 46 The purpose of
organizational
studies, historically, was to design
employment practices that would contribute to workplace
efficiency, not to address aberrant employee attitudes and
misconduct. 47 In addition, organizational studies found
their academic home in the business schools, which became
dominated by economics with that discipline's emphasis on
48
rational efficiency in production and business strategies.
It is only over time, as well-publicized disasters and costly
failures and scandals have occurred in organizations, that
researchers in this field have explored the organizational
factors in the misconduct. There is now a considerable
organizational literature on the subject that the following
can only briefly highlight.
The organization is theoretically one of the largest units
of analysis for misconduct, other than the industry, 49 the

45. See JANIS, supra note 38, at 260-76.

46. See VARDI & WEITZ, supra note 18, at 8.
47. See PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 10-11.

48. See id. at 13-14.
49. Certain kinds of misconduct have been seen to be industry practices.
One thinks of the various abuses in broker-dealers involving initial public
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society, and the culture in which it is situated. The study of
misconduct in organizations could thus focus on different
levels within it, whether the individual, his or her position
or role in the organization, the work group, or the
organization. As already noted, individual factors or
predispositions have an undeniable role in misconduct by
senior decision-makers, but may also have a social and
organizational origin. Again, for example, if executives are
taught in business schools and then encouraged in business
firms to see self-interested profit maximization as an
acceptable goal, this affects their individual attitudes and
conduct. To take another example, an individualistic
culture, such as our own, makes executives think of
themselves as responsible for their decisions and actions in
business firms-a perspective, as discussed later, shared by
regulators and prosecutors. 50 In other words, an
organizational perspective helps explain why in our culture
individuals, not organizations, are primarily blamed for
organizational misconduct. 51
Organizational theorists observe that occupying a
position at the top of a business hierarchy isolates an
individual and can reinforce and amplify his or her

offerings in the late 1990s, such as a broker-dealer's provision of IPO shares to
executives of firms with which the broker-dealer did business. See generally
NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §
13.07[H], at 13-64.1 to 13-69 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
50. See PFEFFER, supranote 4, at 41.
51. Organizational theorists suggest that one form of organizational
corruption involves the spread of corrupt behavior, such as theft from the
organization, from individual to individual. See Jonathan Pinto et al., Corrupt
Organizations or Organizations of Corrupt Individuals? Two Types of
Organization-Level Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 685, 688-90 (2008). This
kind of organizational corruption, which is individual-based, is contrasted with
a "top-down" organizational corruption, which generally comes from those
higher in the organization and at least ostensibly appears to be for the benefit
of the organization (e.g., misrepresenting financial results to maintain the stock
price). See id. at 689-90. The focus of this Article is on the "top down" version of
organizational misconduct.
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misconduct. 52 Since executives are at the summit of the
organization, they do not always get feedback about the
effects of their decisions and conduct, and, even more
significantly, their inappropriateness.5 3 Feedback can be
filtered to tell an executive what he or she wants to hear,
i.e., to confirm his or her own views, particularly if, as
discussed earlier, the members of the group share the same
perspective as the executive and are subject to groupthink
or other group pathologies.5 4 That is, position helps senior
decision-makers believe that their views and actions are
superior and acceptable, rather than flawed and even
unethical or illegal. This isolation is all the more serious if,
as is generally the case in an organization, the attitudes
and conduct of the senior decision-maker influence,
and are
55
imitated by, those lower in the organization.
This review of position as a factor in misconduct in
senior decision-makers leads to a discussion
of
organizational culture and the role of board members and
senior executives in creating it. Senior decision-makers in
many ways maintain and develop the culture of a business
firm, which permeates the organization and normalizes

52. See VARDI & WEITZ, supra note 18, at 155. Positions with autonomy,
which are generally occupied by senior decision-makers in business firms, have
enhanced risk, if only because autonomous individuals have the freedom to
misbehave without immediate oversight or check. See id. at 148. Since senior
executives particularly identify with an organization because of their position,
their misconduct may have benefiting the firm as one purpose (e.g., falsifying
financial records to maintain a high stock price).
53. See id. at 155. Moreover, by occupying a high-level position, the
executive or board member may think of the organization as an extension of
himself or herself and thus not even recognize certain conduct as misconduct,
but think of it as his or her due or privilege (e.g., the unapproved use of a
company airplane). See id. Organizational theorists also observe that executive
position reinforces certain personal attributes, such as the illusion of personal
superiority that enables him or her to take exclusive credit for an organization's
success, which can ultimately lead the executive to act outside ethical and legal
bounds. See David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the
Psychology of DecisionMaking, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 1996, at 9, 17-18.
54.

See

KARL E. WEICK, MAKING SENSE OF THE ORGANIZATION 370-71 (2001).

55. See id. at 370.
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certain conduct. 56 Organizational culture is constituted of
the values and goals, and the ways of thinking and
behaving, that typify the organization. 57 In all but
extremely marginal institutions, this culture must make
sense within the society in which the organization exists.
The organizational culture does not arise overnight, but is
created over the life of the organization and is renewed and
changed, sometimes imperceptibly, almost daily. From one
organizational perspective, organizations, with their beliefs,
codes, roles, and culture, are social constructions to make
sense of the activities to which the business organization is
committed. 58 Yet, if the organizational culture that results
over time from this process of repeated actions and
reinforcing perspectives and justifications is flawed or
improper, it can lead to a corruption of the organization, or
to a spectacular mishap. 59
Organizational culture persists because new members
are indoctrinated into it-not unlike the way they are

56. See VARDI & WEITZ, supra note 18, at 215-18; see also Linda Kiebe
Trevifio et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What
Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1999, at 131, 141-42. A charismatic leader
who helps an organization in a time of ambiguity and uncertainty may be
particularly important in the development of organizational culture. See
PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 132-33; see also WEICK, supra note 54, at 70
(observing that a leader is often someone who, in the face of uncertainty, is
willing to make sense of circumstances and to take action; if the action does not
work, the leader has at least benefited from the effort and can refine his or her
interpretation of the uncertainty).
57. See PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 120-26.

58. See WEICK, supra note 54, at 19. Weick also proposes that organizations
do not deliberate and arrive at grand designs about their business strategies,
and then enact them into reality, but that they offer post-hoc justification or
explanation for an organization's actions, reactions or events affecting it, which
accounts then become the basis for further actions. Id. at 26-27.
59. In the former case, one thinks of Enron, with the gradual adoption and
even celebration of a model of organizational behavior based upon selfinterested, individualistic competition, which model was the creation of groups
at the top of Enron, until the organization imploded from its widespread
corruption. In a more benign, but still disastrous case, organizational theorists
use as an example NASA's shift of emphasis from safety to lowering costs and
tight scheduling of space flights, which led to a sacrifice of flight quality and the
disasters of the Challenger and the Columbia. See Robert D. Dimitroff et al.,
Organizational Behavior and Disaster: A Study of Conflict at NASA, 36
PROJECT MGMT. J. 28 (2005).
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socialized into groups. 60 They become "committed" to it,
which is a process whereby an individual "bonds" with the
organization, often through arduous recruiting and training
strategies. 61 Organizational literature on commitment
emphasizes that the process may amplify misconduct
because members remain committed to the organization
even when it is clearly engaged in unethical or illegal
activity. This discussion is related to the previously
discussed social psychological literature on groups, for
individuals in organizations have essentially adopted
organizational "selves," which identities are difficult to
62
abandon while the individuals remain in the organization.
Not unexpectedly, the organizational literature teaches
that problems in an organization do not appear all of a
sudden, only in moments of stress. Generally, the
corruption of the culture in a business enterprise takes
place over a long time and, in many cases, is almost
imperceptible and, at first, occurs unconsciously. 63 As noted
earlier, a senior executive in a business organization may
make a decision or approve conduct that is marginally
64
improper, but that is done for the organization's benefit.
Other senior decision-makers, or directors, go along with it,
either because they do not even notice its impropriety 65 or
because their organizational self blocks out any other
60. See PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 120-26.

61. See id. at 116-20.
62. See Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption
in Organizations, 25 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 10 (2003); Linda K. Trevifio et al.,
Behavioral Ethics in Organizations:A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951, 968 (2006).
63. This corruption often takes place in highly competitive environments
subject to relatively weak legal and ethical oversight. See Ashforth & Anand,
supra note 62, at 5-6.
64. Again, this model would follow the paradigm of a corrupt organization,
as opposed to an organization of corrupt individuals. See Pinto et al., supranote
51, at 689. On the role of the leaders as being the primary cause of corrupt
organizational behavior, see Ashforth & Anand, supra note 62, at 6-8.
65. Psychologists present evidence, taken from laboratory experiments, that
if unethical or improper actions are small in nature and are taken over time,
people do not even notice them and that, if they do, they are less inclined to
object to them than to an unethical action that is a major departure from past
conduct. See Francesca Gino & Max H. Bazerman, Slippery Slopes and
Misconduct: The Effect of Gradual Degradationon the Failureto Notice Others'
Unethical Behavior (Working Paper No. 06-007, 2006), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/06-007.pdf.
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perspective (such as an "ethical" self) that would object to
it.66 The next impropriety is a repetition, or a slight
extension, of the earlier one. 67 The misconduct then
becomes "normal" and routine; it becomes part of the
organizational culture. 68 When, often years later, the
improprieties are detected and punished, they are then

66. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., Why We Aren't as Ethical as We Think We
Are: A Temporal Explanation 10 (Working Paper No. 08-012, 2007), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/researchlpdf/08-012.pdf. As noted earlier, social psychological
theory posits that individuals assume multiple "selves" according to the social
context that they occupy. Some organizational theorists and psychologists
reduce this framework by arguing that an individual is composed of two basic
"selves," the one being devoted to short-term interests and impulses (which are
emotionally and instinctually compelling) and the other having a long-term
perspective, including ethics (which take more cognitive effort). They contend
that misconduct and approval of misconduct occur because, at the time of the
decision, conduct, or approval, the short-term self predominates and the longterm self is pushed to the background. They call this process "ethical fading."
See id. at 19-24; Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading. The
Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 225 (2004).
Moreover, from another perspective, self-interest may imperceptibly, and not
rationally, affect a person's view as to the propriety of a particular action and
then lead the person retrospectively to offer rational justifications for it, as
opposed to acknowledging the self-interested basis for the action; in other
words, individuals co-opt themselves into doing evil. See Ashforth & Anand,
supra note 62, at 29; see also Thomas M. Jones & Lori Verstegen Ryan, The
Link Between Ethical Judgment and Action in Organizations: A Moral
Approbation Approach, 8 ORG. SCI. 663, 676 (1997) (proposing that unethical
behavior by individuals in organizations is affected by four basic factors, which
can bring forward, or push backwards, moral behavior: (1) severity of
consequences (i.e., really bad outcomes induce moral behavior), (2) certainty of
one's moral position (i.e., ambiguous or unclear situations will decrease moral
behavior), (3) complicity in action or decision (i.e., if responsibility is diffused,
moral behavior decreases), and (4) organizational pressure to conform (i.e.,
decreases ethical behavior)).
67. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 66, at 228. Other senior
executives often accept the misconduct, as do their advisors, because they all
want to maintain their position in and approval of the group and organization.
See Gino & Bazerman, supra note 65, at 40-41.
68. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 62, at 8-15; Vilmos F. Misangyi et al.,
Ending Corruption: The Interplay Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and
InstitutionalEntrepreneurs, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 750, 752 (2008). When corrupt
action becomes a routine, individuals do not see its goal or moral implications; it
becomes simply part of an organizational process that is not examined: "this is
how things are done." Moreover, the corrupt action may even seem to be the
action that ought to occur: "this is how things should be done." The deviant
organizational culture becomes "rationalized" by fitting it into accepted social
goals, with the rationalization following a pattern. See Anand et al., supra note
44, at 11 (listing rationalizations).
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clearly seen as being improper, sometimes even by the
perpetrators themselves, but
only with a new, one might
69
say an external, perspective.
2. Preventing
Misconduct
in
Organizations.
Organizational literature provides guidance on how
organizations can prevent, or at least reduce, misconduct.
Not
surprisingly,
organizational
culture
figures
prominently in this guidance. According to the literature, a
well-functioning organization has an organizational culture,
fostered by its leaders, that emphasizes "trust, honesty, and
self-respect" among its members, who communicate
honestly, openly, and respectfully with each other. 70 An
organization must also be grounded upon ethics and
morality, which reflect existing social values, and upon the
long-term continuation of the society in which it exists. The
basis for the organizational culture thus has to 71
be
something other than self-interested profit maximization.

69. This could be the ethical self s perspective, or that of any social self
external to the self that the individual uses in the firm. In addition, it takes
some effort for perpetrators of misconduct to acknowledge their wrongdoing,
since individuals tend to distort their memories so that, in retrospect, the
individual presents himself or herself as acting more morally and properly than
he or she in fact acted at the time. See Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 66, at 2430.
70. See WEICK, supra note 54, at 114. Thus, an organization member must
have the freedom of action to challenge a questionable action that appears to be
done for the benefit of the organization, but runs against social norms and even
the law. See Russell Cropanzano et al., The Management of Organizational
Justice, 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 34, 35-36 (2008) (discussing organizational
justice); Donald Lange, A Multidimensional Conceptualizationof Organizational
CorruptionControl, 33 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 710, 716-22 (2008) (discussing control
mechanisms for organizational corruption, including the promotion of an
environment where employees have the freedom to question decisions and
actions and the internalization of organizational values in employees).
71. Organizations grounded upon self-interest have been found to be more
likely to engage in unethical conduct. The organizational literature is uniform
on this subject. See Trevifio et al., supra note 62, at 966; see also Anand et al.,
supra note 44, at 18-19 (arguing that unethical behavior came from
management systems that required divisions and subdivisions to meet financial
goals, without concern about how this was achieved); LaRue T. Hosmer, The
Institutionalizationof Unethical Behavior, 6 J. Bus. ETHICS 439 (1987) (same);
Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., Building Houses on Rocks: The Role of the Ethical
Infrastructure in Organizations, 16 Soc. JUST. RES. 285, 295 (2003)
(hypothesizing that an organizational climate of respect for others places an
emphasis on others and thus decreases a focus on self-interest in the
organization); Trevifio et al., supra note 56, at 132 (noting that employees
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As discussed above, misconduct can occur in an
organization when an executive or employee adopts from
the organization's culture an organizational self or identity
that accepts unethical or illegal conduct and that pushes
aside and competes with the individual's other "selves,"
which have different origins and even ethical foundations. 72
A healthy organizational culture would not be opposed to,
and should reinforce, these other selves in an individual
while he or she is a member of an organization. 73 This
reinforcement does not happen just because an organization
has formal codes of ethics and policies stating that its
members should be ethical and follow the law, but from,
again, an organizational culture exemplified by its leaders
and internalized by organization members that allows for
this expression.
A goal of the organizational literature is to design
specific procedures and policies to help organizations create
an ethical culture. 74 Organizational theorists argue that an
organization should allow ethics to be considered in
decisions at all levels of an organization-again, a formal
code of ethics does not suffice-and actual practices in the
organizations should be regularly reviewed from an ethical
perspective to prevent ethics from fading into the

identify firms that place the most emphasis upon self-interest and unquestioned
obedience to authority to be unethical).
72. Here is where the individual level and organizational level interact.
Certain individuals who do not have strong moral selves developed from other
contexts may be particularly prone to an organizational environment that
advocates unethical action, since their stage of moral development tells them to
follow the prevailing organizational culture, not simply to do what is right in a
larger social or abstract sense. See Neal M. Ashkanasy et al., Bad Apples in Bad
Barrels Revisited: Cognitive Moral Development, Just World Beliefs, Rewards,
and Ethical Decision-Making, 16 Bus. ETHICS Q. 449 (2006) (presenting
empirical evidence that, among other things, those with the lowest cognitive
moral development and with a high belief in a just world were most likely to
approve unethical decisions in business settings).
73. See Trevifio et al., supra note 62, at 962.
74. Treviflo notes that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines acknowledge the
importance of organizational culture. See id. at 979.
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background. 75 Executives should use ethical considerations
in decision-making (i.e., making ethics salient to
decisions), 76 pre-commit to ethical action before making a
decision, and even decrease the pressure on and increase
the simplicity of a particular decision (because it takes
intellectual capacity and effort to introduce ethical
considerations into the decision-making). 77 An organization
must also anticipate the effects of its decisions from an
ethical perspective. 78
If an organization does not have an ethical culture,
during the inevitable times of stress that all organizations
encounter, other goals fill the void. Given the prevalent
business training, its members are likely to base their
conduct upon values, such as self-interest, that conflict with
larger organizational and social values; worse, the

75. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 62, at 39. Having a code of ethics
without ethical practices may in fact lead to more misconduct. See Anand et al.,
supra note 44, at 19. It sends a kind of perverse signal that ethics is window
dressing to be disregarded. Scholars of business ethics observe that
organizational ethics involves, from an analytical perspective, three levels in
the organization, in the following order of increasing importance: (1) formal
systems of stating ethical goals for the organization, monitoring compliance
with these goals, and sanctioning (i.e., rewarding compliance, punishing noncompliance), (2) informal systems of the same, and (3) organizational climates
(a part of organizational culture) built upon and promoting ethics, respect, and
procedural justice. See, e.g., Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 71, at 287. The most
ethical organization will be one that has a fundamental ethical foundation or
"values orientation." See Trevifio et al., supra note 56 (explaining the
characteristics of such an organization, which includes ethical leadership, fair
treatment of employees, ethical matters raised in ordinary decisions, and ethics
being a matter in performance reviews, not unquestioning obedience to
authority).
76. This is based on the theory that, although individuals may have
considerable moral development, they may not foreground their moral decisionmaking in certain settings, where organizational factors push it into the
background. See Trevifio et al., supra note 62, at 956; see also Tenbrunsel &
Messick, supra note 66, at 232.
77. See Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 66, at 35-36.
78. See Chun Wei Choo, Information Failuresand OrganizationalDisasters,
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 2005, at 8, 10. This is just another way of
saying that an organization must anticipate different scenarios and not simply
go with a decision that "feels" right, and honestly evaluate the effects of its
action on all its constituencies.
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organization will magnify the pursuit of self-interest. This,
79
then, can lead to organizational disasters.
C. Lessons from Social Psychology and Organizational
Theory
The purpose of the preceding discussion was to identify,
through a broad review of only some of the relevant
literature in social psychology and organizational studies,
several group and organizational causes of and factors in
misconduct by senior decision-makers in business
organizations. This review was necessary because the
remainder of this Article considers how well corporate law
and the enforcement of the securities law takes account of
these causes and factors in their approaches to this
misconduct.
A few lessons emerge from the review. First, both social
psychology and organizational studies suggest that a
group's mindset and an organization's culture can
significantly contribute to misconduct of an organization
member. This lesson rests on the assumption that an
individual assumes a social identity, in a work group and
business organization, that orients his or her thinking and
conduct in that setting. If this mindset or culture is corrupt
in some way, which means that it is based upon improper,
unethical, or illegal goals, it often offers its members
nothing more than the pursuit of self-interest, it encourages
conduct in keeping with these goals, and the group or
organization member is more likely to engage in
misconduct. The literature also explains that, while
misconduct in organizations can be instigated by a corrupt
individual, which means that an individual knows what is
right or legal and does the opposite (he or she is the
proverbial "bad apple"), a group or organization member
who is not a "bad apple," but whose moral development is
not the strongest, may engage in misconduct almost
unconsciously in line with his or her organizational self,
even though his or her actions would be in conflict with the
other social identities or selves that the group or
organization member possesses. For example, a senior
79. See WEICK, supra note 54, at 141. This kind of organizational rigidity
also characterizes "groupthink," which may go hand in hand with it. See id. at
276.
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executive who engages in fraud in his or her company may
be an excellent father or mother, a pillar of the community,
and a strong supporter of charitable causes.80 In other
words, misconduct is often amplified by the group and
organization, rather than only being due to defects in the
81
individual; it is also a question of a "bad barrel."
Moreover, organizational misconduct may also not be easily
traceable to one bad act; rather, it is made up of small
decisions or actions that may be at first ethically or legally
equivocal and that are the bases for later decisions or
actions that eventually and cumulatively are clearly
unethical and illegal.
Second, both social psychology and organizational
studies emphasize the significance of the leader in
perpetuating and shaping a group's mindset and an
organization's culture and thus in checking or promoting
misconduct. This role is based upon the fact of the leader's
importance in decision-making and power in hierarchical
business organizations, although a leader's effectiveness
does not just turn on his or her position in the group or
organization. The leader also embodies the views and
aspirations of the group and organization and, again given
his or her importance, the leader can push the mindset or
culture in a new direction, for good or bad. Obviously, there
are limits to how far the leader can move the group or
organization, especially since the mindset and culture
generally precede the leader, have a social identity apart
from him or her, and are the reason why he or she was
selected in the first place. But, given the leader's special
position, both social psychology and organizational studies
would find it appropriate to put some blame on the leader
for misconduct by group or organization members, and of
course by the leader himself or herself.
Third, how the group or organization functions clearly
affects whether it checks or amplifies misconduct by its
members. In both the group and organization contexts, it is
important that open, honest, and respectful participation by
80. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 62, at 3 ("Our analysis suggests an
answer to the intriguing question of how a person who is a loving parent,
thoughtful neighbor and devout churchgoer is able to engage in workplace
corruption.").
81. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 66, at 229 ("[T]he system [] is the
real culprit.").
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its members be allowed-even if the leader ultimately
makes the decision-and that there be dissent and
''cognitive conflict." These procedures allow members to
challenge attitudes or actions that a member feels are
improper and/or may corrupt the group or organization.
Proper group or organizational dynamics contrast with
ones, such as groupthink, that impose silence (or the
equivalent of silence) upon participants, which shuts out
dissent, and reinforces the group's or organization's
perspective, even if it is flawed. The functioning of the
group or organization is connected to its mindset or culture,
for either the mindset or culture evolves so as to permit its
members to identify and resist misconduct, or it pushes
them to resist change and amplify bad behavior. It is
difficult to imagine how a group or organization that is
properly functioning in these terms would allow misconduct
to persist and grow. A properly functioning organization
thus has an "institutional logic" that resists misconduct,
which includes the organizational belief system, its
identities, roles, and practices, not just routine and formal
procedures for considering ethical issues and preventing
misconduct (i.e., formal compliance programs). To produce
this kind of organization thus requires a social, cultural
approach, not limited to changing incentives for individual
82
actors, which is the perspective of the economic model.
Fourth and finally, what is clear from the above
discussion is that the group and organization must be based
upon social, ethical, and legal foundations and cannot be
sustainable if built only or primarily upon the self-interest
of its individual members. This lesson may underscore a
major difference between these disciplines and economics,
whose theoretical model of human behavior as the selfinterested profit-maximizer has permeated, and corrupted,
finance and business. The view from social psychology and
organizational studies is that a group or organization built
upon self-interest exhibits the structural and functional
failings identified above and is prone to unethical and
illegal conduct. This is a pessimistic conclusion, for it
suggests that, so long as U.S. business espouses this model,
corruption will constantly occur and be magnified in
business organizations, for the model affects how people

82. See Misangyi et al., supra note 68, at 763.
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think and behave.8 3 Indeed, it suggests that, since senior
decision-makers in public business firms are the product of
U.S. business schools and the business "culture," which
embodies the most extreme version of this model, the
outlook for business firms is exceedingly grim. Therefore,
social psychology and organizational studies caution that a
fundamental reform to the orientation of business and
business training may be necessary to reduce misconduct by
senior decision-makers in business organizations.
II. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCONDUCT OF
SENIOR DECISION-MAKERS

This Part conducts a targeted review of several legal
areas in order to see how well they take into account the
group or organizational causes of or factors in senior-level
misconduct that were just discussed. It first briefly
considers corporate law only because this law establishes
the governance structure for the corporation and the duties
for the executives and directors, and it is the foundation
upon which all law concerning the public business firm is
built. This Part then examines federal securities law, which
historically has complemented corporate law by imposing
additional duties upon senior decision-makers when their
company is public. The focus of this examination is less on
the substance of the laws than on their enforcement by the
SEC. Finally, this Part looks at federal criminal prosecution
of the decision-makers for federal securities law violations.
The analysis of civil and criminal enforcement of the federal
securities laws particularly considers organizational
liability, in conjunction or in contrast with individual
liability, for holding a public firm liable for the acts of its
directors, officers, and employees squarely raises the issue
of group and organizational causes of their misconduct. It
must be again emphasized that this Part is not intended to
be a comprehensive review of corporate law or securities
law enforcement. Rather, it establishes succinctly how the
law neglects group or organizational factors, as highlighted
in the previous Part, in dealing with senior-level
misconduct.

83. See id. at 764-65.
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A. CorporateLaw
To put it bluntly, corporate law is tailor-made for a
consideration of group and organizational factors in or
causes of misconduct by senior decision-makers, but the
jurisprudence has generally not explored, and has in fact
closed down, this kind of analysis. Under basic corporate
law, a group, the board of directors, is at the apex of
corporate governance, which is the structure of decision and
power in a corporation; the board is the ultimate decisionmaker in a public corporation.8 4 Therefore, group processes
should be a focus of corporate law jurisprudence. Even more
suggestive from the perspective of social psychology and
organizational studies, this jurisprudence generally views
the board of directors as a group when it performs its
classic action: making decisions.8 5 Thus, whenever a court
reviews a shareholder challenge to a board's decision, it
generally looks at it as a group action and would impose
liability upon all group members. This was certainly true in
the case known to all law students who take the basic
corporations course, Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the board
members were blamed for being too passive and hasty in
approving a sale of their company that the Chairman/CEO
proposed and advocated.8 6 As in Smith, courts occasionally
and intriguingly raise issues of group dynamics and
processes. For example, the jurisprudence alludes to group
passivity in the face of a dominant, authoritarian leader,
points to group acquiescence in a questionable action, even
if individual members privately had reservations about the
decision that they never brought up in group

84. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b), at 8-3 (2008).

85. There are, in effect, two basic legal tasks of the board: to make business
decisions, which usually involves approving a proposed strategy of senior
executives, and to ensure that the corporation has in place the proper internal
control and operational systems. On this latter focus, see Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362, 368-69 (Del. 2006). The board's specific duties, as understood by
business practitioners are numerous. See JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS' AND
OFFICERS' LiABiLiTY § 2:2.1 (2d ed., Release No. 2, Oct. 2007). Since Delaware
corporate law jurisprudence is the most significant in the United States for
public corporations, because most of them are incorporated in Delaware, I shall
refer only to it and to model corporate codes in this subsection.
86. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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deliberations,87 and signals group dynamics that make it
difficult for directors-as members of a cohesive group-to
judge one another.88 Generally, an individual director is not
singled out unless he or she distinguished himself in some
way, e.g., by being the inside director (like Van Gorkom)
who was actively engaged in or directed the misconduct.
Even here this means that the targeted director or
executive is juxtaposed against the group of other directors.
Why, then, has nothing much come of this
jurisprudential acknowledgement of the importance of this
group of senior decision-makers in the public firm? The
simple answer is that directors have almost no risk of
liability under corporate law when they make their group
decisions. As is well-known, corporate law imposes liability
for flaws in the board's decision-making only if the board
fails to meet a very low standard of conduct, gross
negligence. In other words, directors are liable only if they
neglect to make a decision or if they make a completely
irrational decision.8 9 Moreover, even if a boarO fails to
satisfy this low standard of conduct, corporate law statutes
protect directors from liability for money damages from a
violation of the duty of care. 90
The point here is not to enter into a longstanding
debate among corporate scholars as to whether this freedom

87. See, e.g., ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N., 2006
WL 3783520, at *21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).
88. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981).
89. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368-70 (Del. 1993).
That is, if directors go through the decision-making process, which means
gathering information and deliberating for a long enough time, and if the
decision is not irrational, the courts accord their decision "business judgment"
deference, which means that they dismiss any shareholder complaint about the
substance of the decision. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (1994). There are, of course, exceptions
to this business judgment deference: it does not apply if directors approve a
violation of the law, act in bad faith, or engage in self-interested behavior.
90. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (Delaware's
exculpatory statute). Directors are also provided with contractual rights to have
their defense expenses advanced and ultimately paid by the corporation, either
through its own funds or through directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance.
Amounts paid in settlement are similarly indemnified by the corporation or
covered by insurance. See generally TY R. SAGALOW, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
LIABILITY INSURANCE: A DIRECTOR'S GuIDE (2000).
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from liability for directors is the correct outcome. 91 The
main point is that this liability protection for directors in
the due care context short-circuits any development of
jurisprudence on group dynamics in the boardroom. That is,
if plaintiffs were to allege that poor group dynamics led a
board to make a poor decision-such as waiving a conflicts
policy to allow a company executive to do a transaction with
a firm-or not to exercise appropriate supervision over
executives, the lawsuit would likely not even survive 92a
motion to dismiss, much less get past summary judgment.
An analysis of group or organizational factors in or
causes of misconduct equally does not emerge from
jurisprudence on executives, like the CEO, who work in
executive teams. Courts apply the same standard of conduct
(i.e., gross negligence) to an executive who makes a
business decision. 93 The executive who is a director-in
corporate law parlance, an inside director-receives the
same statutory relief from liability as does any other
director. While non-director executives do not benefit from
the absolute relief from money damages provided by the
statutes, they have legal and contractual indemnification
rights, defense expense advancement, and directors' and

91. Common reasons given for not making outside directors liable for their
gross negligence are that they are only part-time supervisors, that they should
not be discouraged from taking risks, and that it is often inappropriate to judge
people in hindsight. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01 cmt. d.
For a flavor of the debate about courts' deference to directors' decisions, see, for
example, STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 251-69
(2002).
92. There is, of course, jurisprudence suggesting that the statutory relief
from liability must be used as an affirmative defense by the directors. See
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999). However, even
this line of jurisprudence would hold that a complaint can be dismissed for this
reason if it articulates only a duty of care complaint (i.e., there are no
allegations concerning violations of the directors' other duties). See Malpiede v.
Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093 (Del. 2001).
93. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01, at 138 (making no
distinction between standards applicable to directors and officers). See generally

Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60
Bus. LAw. 439 (2005) (arguing that officers should be held to an agent's
standard of care, which is negligence, and not be accorded business judgment
deference). But see Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III,

Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005) (contending that the same standard of
conduct should apply to directors and officers).
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officers' insurance, which may together amount to the same
94
protection.
The other major standard of conduct imposed upon a
director or executive is the duty of loyalty, also known as
the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and to deal fairly with
the corporation.9 5 By definition, this duty is the
foundational agency mandate for an individual fiduciary to
avoid self-interested transactions and thus not to benefit
himself or herself at the corporation's expense.9 6 Thus, a
group and organization is, as a definitional matter,
irrelevant in the jurisprudence on the duty; the focus of the
analysis is whether the individual behaved fairly, defined in
both procedural and substantive terms, towards the
corporation. 97 Historically, courts recognized, in a
commonsense kind of way, that group dynamics were
present in conflicts cases. Under the common law, an
officer's or director's transaction with his or her firm was
void, partly because it was acknowledged that fellow
directors and officers might be inclined, for group reasons,
to favor the director or officer at the expense of the

94. For officers, as well as directors, indemnification and insurance works as
follows. Generally, corporate statutes authorize a corporation to indemnify, and
to provide insurance for, directors and officers and, in some cases, they mandate
that the corporation indemnify a director or officer (e.g., where he or she has
prevailed in a lawsuit). A corporation then typically provides for the
indemnification in its bylaws and in contracts with the officer or director, and it
purchases a D&O policy, which may cover some of its indemnification expenses
as well as additional liabilities. See generally FANTO, supra note 85, at 8-1 to 85.
95. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE cmt. a, at 199.

96. As the jurisprudence on this duty has developed, it has become
sophisticated enough to recognize that the "self' includes the interests of those
close to the director or officer, such as family members. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.60, at 8-109 to 8-111 (2008).
97. This is a complicated area, which the above greatly simplifies, as every
student of corporations knows. Generally, under their equity jurisprudence,
courts will examine the fairness of a self-interested transaction. Corporate
statutes provide both that the transaction is not automatically voidable because
of the involvement of the director or officer and that there are ways to insulate
it from later challenge, such as by having prior approval of the disinterested
directors or the shareholders, or a ratification by the shareholders. Depending
upon the jurisdiction, these pre-approvals have considerable effect: they may
lessen the court's standard of review of the transaction. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT §§ 8.62, 8.63 & Official Cmts., at 8-122 to 8-130; PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE § 5.02 reporter n.7, at 242 (for discussion of Delaware's approach).
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corporation. Yet that ancient social psychological insight
was put aside in favor of economic efficiency (i.e., a
transaction that might be economically beneficial for both
the director or officer and the corporation should not be
prohibited), and corporate law statutes have overridden the
common law prohibition, substituting for it approval by a
disinterested board or shareholders. This means that, when
there is a self-interested transaction engaged in by one
director or officer, courts generally uphold the transaction
so long as directors or shareholders who are not themselves
self-interested, generally defined to mean financially
interested, approved it.
Thus, in the statutes and in the jurisprudence
interpreting them, a director is barred from approving
another's self-interested transaction only if he or she is also
self-interested, which means that there is no legal
recognition of how a group or organization may affect a
director's approval in these circumstances. Sometimes
courts acknowledge that group dynamics might play a role
in the approval, as when a director-such as one who is also
a controlling shareholder and CEO-dominates or
influences other directors so that they go along with a
transaction that benefits himself or herself, but that does
not directly advantage the others. 98 Yet, there is no more
development here than there was in the duty of care
jurisprudence because the focus of analysis is always
primarily on the financially interested director or officer. 99
If the passivity, inaction, or complicity of the other directors
is challenged at all, it will not be examined in any detail
because, again, they will not be liable for what amounts to
nothing more than a violation of their duty of care, with the
consequences that have been explained above.
98. In such cases, the focus is on the controlling shareholder and director,
rather than on the other related directors, who are seen as his or her proxies.
See Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061-62 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd,
872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005). But see In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders
Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (finding
directors liable because they made their decision to please the controlling
shareholder). Under Delaware jurisprudence, the transactions of a controlling
shareholder are examined for fairness, no matter what the decision-making
structure (e.g., approval of a special committee of independent directors). See
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (holding that fairness
includes an analysis of fair price and fair dealing).
99. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.18, at 222-23.
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For a time, a third duty of directors and officers, the
duty of good faith, had potential for allowing courts to
recognize group and organizational factors or dynamics in
senior-level misconduct. 100 From the reverse perspective, a
lack of good faith, or bad faith, appears to mean an
intentional or reckless failure on the part of directors or
officers to perform their tasks, such as when directors fail to
make a necessary decision or to implement an appropriate
monitoring system for their firm. 101 Thus, one could
imagine that jurisprudence on the duty of good faith could
develop, in the way that duty of care jurisprudence never
could, to explore problematic director or executive group
and organizational dynamics and pathologies that resulted
in serious harm to the firm and its shareholders. For
example, bad faith could be exemplified by directors'
allowing a Chair/CEO to set the board's agenda and to
dominate its discussions, i.e., by their remaining too passive
in the face of, and not objecting to, an improper board
deliberative structure. More importantly, exculpation of
liability would not be an obstacle to the development of
jurisprudence on this duty, for the exculpatory statutes by
their terms do not apply to violations of it.102
The problem is that the Delaware courts have been
reluctant to read the good faith duty expansively, even in
circumstances that were arguably favorable to this reading.
The example that comes to mind is the Disney case, where
there were allegations, and considerable evidence, that the
board of Walt Disney had flawed group dynamics, partly
because of an imperious, highly domineering, and almost
psychotic CEO, the notorious Michael Eisner. When one of
his major gaffes, the hiring and almost immediate
termination of his friend, Michael Ovitz, as Disney
president became the basis for a shareholder lawsuit
alleging, among other things, a violation of the good faith
duty by the board compensation committee and the entire
board, both the Delaware Chancery Court, after a trial on
the merits, and the Delaware Supreme Court, on appeal,

100. On this duty, see generally Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004).

101. For this definition, see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906
A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
102. See id. at 67.
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did not find a violation of this duty. 103 Rather than focusing
on the dynamics of committee and board conduct, the courts
each transformed the potential "group" good faith analysis
into an individual question, i.e., whether the circumstances
suggested that a particularDisney director was reckless in
fulfilling his or her tasks.
The Delaware Supreme Court has since reinforced this
individualistic focus of the good faith analysis in its most
important statement on the duty in Stone v. Ritter.10 4 In a
case involving the issue whether the board had ensured
that the firm had proper internal monitoring systems in
place, the Court explained that the duty of good faith was in
fact part of the duty of loyalty. 10 5 As discussed above, this
latter duty by definition deals with issues of self-interest.
By situating the duty of good faith within the duty of
loyalty, the jurisprudential import is that the focus on selfinterest of the latter effectively blocks the possibilities of
exploration of group and organizational causes for senior
decision-maker misconduct that might otherwise exist in
the former (as happened in Disney). More will be said about
this in Part III below, which discusses legal reforms to push
recognition of group and organizational causes in the law.
But this overview of corporate law jurisprudence shows that
the foundation of public firm corporate governance ignores
the social side of misconduct.
B. Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws
Federal securities law is ultimately more promising
than corporate law in taking account of group and
organizational factors in senior-level misconduct in public
firms. As seen by numerous corporate scandals, the fraud in
public companies that is actionable under the federal
securities laws is rarely due to the misconduct of one
person, even an important person such as the CEO. Rather,
it is a product of many people and groups within a7

103. See id. at 67-68. For the lower court decision, see 907 A.2d 693, 755-56
(Del. Ch. 2005).
104. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
105. Id. at 370.
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particular business firm. 106 As discussed in this and the
following sections, in enforcing the securities law, the SEC,
in civil enforcement proceedings, and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), in criminal proceedings, pursue both
individuals and organizations, thus squarely raising the
issue of group and organizational responsibility for fraud.
However, this enforcement activity is disappointing from a
social psychological and organizational perspective since
the focus of the SEC and the DOJ is almost exclusively on
individuals, with organizational responsibility and reform
as something of an afterthought. This section offers a quick
overview of the federal securities law and an analysis of the
SEC's approach to organizational liability, which focuses on
individual responsibility for fraud. The next section looks at
the similar approach of the DOJ.
1. Generalities. As is common knowledge to every
student of business organizations, the federal securities
laws are all about disclosure from a public company in two
basic contexts: when the company is doing a public offering
of its securities10 7 and when it is providing information to
the securities markets, whether as mandated by law or
otherwise.10 8 In either case, the law's focus is on accurate
disclosure of material information about the company and
is thus designed to prevent fraud in the disclosure; to have

106. This was

my point in Whistleblowing and the Public Director:

Countering CorporateInner Circles, supra note 11.
107. This is the focus of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb
(2006), and its accompanying SEC rules. Officers and directors also have
certain disclosure duties when their company is engaged in a private securities
offering.
108. These duties are found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006), and its accompanying SEC rules, which regulate the
securities markets. To simplify things, companies whose securities are traded in
these markets are participants therein and thus are subject to regulation under
that Act. A public company has multiple disclosure obligations, including the
filing of an annual report on Form 10-K, the filing of quarterly reports on Form
10-Q, the filing of "special" reports on Form 8-K whenever one of the events
enumerated in the Form occurs, and the filing of a proxy statement for the
annual shareholders' meeting. Companies also regularly make public
disclosures that are not required by the Exchange Act (i.e., they simply talk to
the market), and this disclosure is also subject to Exchange Act liability as
discussed below.
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1
a company present itself to investors as it really is. 09

Senior decision-makers in the company, directors and
officers, are part of the disclosure process: they must
provide accurate information about themselves, for this is a
mandatory subject of disclosure. 110 They must also oversee
the disclosure process to ensure that the company portrays
itself in a materially accurate way.
The federal securities laws and regulations recognize
that disclosure is an organizational product. To take the
public offering, the Securities Act and the accompanying
SEC rules regulate in detail the manner in which the
process occurs and reflect the business practice of taking a
regulation
detailed
This
market.11 1
to
company
acknowledges that the process is an organizational and
group undertaking by providing guidelines to the standard
participants in the offering, the company, its accountants,
and the broker-dealer firms marketing the offering, to name
the major ones. The recognition of the public offering as an
organization or group product particularly appears in the
liability provisions of the Securities Act dealing with a
public offering. Under the key liability provision, Section

109. Materiality has been defined to refer to a fact that "there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider . . .
important.... ." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). As
is well known, the disclosure that a company makes under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act has been harmonized in Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.10 (2008).
110. The disclosure about management is extensive and includes a person's
position, age, arrangements pursuant to which he or she received the position,
family relationships with other officers and directors, involvement in certain
kinds of legal proceedings, their compensation, their holdings of securities of the
company, and their transactions with the company. See generally 17 C.F.R.
subpt. 229.400 (2007).
111. The statute thus regulates the three periods of the offering process: the
pre-filing period while a company prepares for the offering, the post-filing
marketing period for the offering, and the sales period. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (the
statute accomplishes this regulation in a convoluted way by prohibiting offers
before the registration statement has been filed (in (c), the pre-filing period), by
requiring that written offers use the statutory prospectus (in (b)(1), the
marketing period), and by allowing sales and delivery of securities only once the
registration statement has been declared effective (in (a), the post-effective
period)). The SEC had made adjustments to this regulation in its own rules as,
over the years, technology has changed the way public offerings are conducted.
See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange
Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed.
Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (most recent reform of offering process).
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the firm, all directors (and those who are named as
about to become directors), all those who sign the
registration statement (which includes major executives
and a majority of directors), 113 any expert who has certified
a part of the statement (this generally means the
accounting firm that certifies the company's financial
statements), and all "underwriters," which means the
broker-dealers marketing the offering, are jointly and
severally liable for fraud in the offering. 114
It is true that Securities Act liability becomes an
individual question. Each potentially liable person has the
well-known "due diligence" defense pursuant to which he or
she can be absolved of liability if he or she acted reasonably
in the circumstances (i.e., without negligence). 115 This
reasonableness analysis, moreover, takes into account the
background, qualifications, and training of the person in
11,112

112. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. There are additional liability provisions in the
Securities Act dealing with a public offering: one concerns the failure to follow
the Act in conducting the offering, 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1), and the other focuses
on the actual seller of the securities to the investor (e.g., broker), 15 U.S.C. §
77l(a)(2).
113. The "registration statement" of a public offering requires a signature of
the CEO, the CFO, the controller or principal accounting officer, and a majority
of the board. See, e.g., Form S-1, Signatures, Instruction No. 1, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secforms.htm; see also 17 C.F.R. § 239.11
(2008). The registration statement is the document filed with the SEC, which
includes the selling document, known as a prospectus, that is distributed to
investors, other disclosures that are publicly filed, but not distributed, and
exhibits.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5). A person who is found liable-without a
due diligence defense (discussed below) and not guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation-however, can seek contribution from the others. See 15
U.S.C. § 77k(f)(1). Again, there are more complications here that need not be
discussed. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f)(2); 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(f)(2) (2006) (stating that
liability of an outside director, rather than being joint and several, is
proportionate to his or her responsibility for the fraud, unless trier of fact
determines that such director "knowingly committed a violation of the securities
laws").
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3), (c). Again, matters get complicated here
because the defense is slightly different depending upon whether the
misleading part of the registration statement was prepared by an expert and
upon whether one is the expert who prepared it. But generally the issue comes
down to negligence in most cases. There are other defenses as well. See 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b)(1), (2) (stating that the individual is required to resign in
protest and notify the SEC of the fraud, or simply report that the registration
statement became effective without his or her knowledge).
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question. 116 However, the company itself has no such
defense and is thus strictly liable for any material
misrepresentation in the public offering. This would appear
at least to raise the issue of organizational processes and
factors that resulted in fraud.
Once a company becomes public and is required to
make its periodic reports to the SEC and otherwise to make
regular disclosure to the securities markets, the
organizational and group nature of the disclosure becomes
even more pronounced, and securities law and regulation
recognize this. A prominent example is the firm's internal
controls. In a large business firm, an accurate account of its
operations and financial results and position are based
upon a firm's internal controls, which basically check that
business operations are conducted in particular ways and
that all transactions are properly and accurately recorded.
Both the financial and non-financial disclosure of a firm
depends upon the appropriateness of the internal controls
for a firm and their design and application. Internal
controls cannot be the work of one person: they must be
decided upon by the senior executives under the supervision
of the board, put in place by internal auditors, followed by
everyone in the firm, and checked for implementation by
outside auditors. The law reflects this fact: it mandates that
a public firm have internal controls; 117 independent
accountants must give an opinion about the controls; and
the two top executives must certify as to the adequacy of
the controls for producing materially accurate disclosure. 118
It is true that, for materially inaccurate Exchange Act
disclosure, the liability focus is individual and has even

116. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2008) (discussing the circumstances that help
to determine what constitutes a reasonable investigation); In re WorldCom Sec.
Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4193, at *24-*25 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005); Escott
v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 684-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006).
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2008) (for officer
certification requirement). Knowingly (or willfully and knowingly) filing a false
certification can result in criminal liability for the officer. See 18 U.S.C. §
1350(c) (Supp. V 2000). Management must also give a report on the internal
controls, and outside auditors must provide a yearly assessment of a public
company's internal control structure. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006); 17 C.F.R. §
240.13a-15 (2008). Again, these are highly complicated and controversial
requirements, which the SEC has phased in gradually for public companies.
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become more so in recent years in the private securities
lawsuits that are a main way in which this disclosure is
policed. As noted above, the focus here is on SEC
enforcement of the securities laws, not on these third party
actions, but it is worth mentioning them very briefly to
underscore the. individual liability in the securities laws
that echoes the one in corporate law. The main anti-fraud
liability provision for a company's Exchange Act filings and
public statements is the catch-all Section 10(b) 119 and Rule
10b-5120 under this provision. In private securities lawsuits,
this liability is highly individualized since, under
jurisprudence on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a person is
liable only if he or she had scienter or bad intent in making
a fraudulent statement or omission. 121 Moreover, even this
individualized liability has become more difficult to
establish as a result of legislative developments and
jurisprudence intended to rein in private securities
lawsuits. Most notably, in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Congress imposed heightened pleading
requirements on plaintiffs bringing these lawsuits, which
made it harder for a plaintiff to produce a sufficient
complaint that would survive a motion to dismiss on the
122
scienter issue.
Furthermore, the focus on individual liability, coupled
with more impediments to establishing it, has been
accompanied by considerable restrictions of any group
liability for fraud in these private lawsuits. Over ten years
ago, the Supreme Court struck down aiding and abetting, or

119. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b) (2006). If, moreover, a director or officer makes, or
causes to be made, a materially false statement in an Exchange Act filing, he or
she can be liable to a purchaser or seller of the company's securities relying
upon such statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
121. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). Moreover, at the pleading stage, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff should plead facts that establish an
inference of scienter that is as compelling as any other explanation of the facts
pertaining to the defendant's state of mind. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2508-10 (2007).
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secondary, liability in private anti-fraud lawsuits. 123 Other
liability provisions and doctrines would appear more
promising to reach a group or an organization and, thus, to
confront organizational factors, but they have not proven to
be such-at least with respect to third party lawsuits.
Senior decision-makers can be liable as controlling persons
for the acts of their underlings, 124 but there are
individualized defenses available to the controlling person
(i.e., no knowledge of the violation and due care in the
supervision of the controlled person). 125 Most useful as a
way to raise organizational factors in senior-level
misconduct is vicarious liability of the public firm under
Section 10(b) through the application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior; for fraud by a corporate agent, such as

123. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). Debate continued on the import of this decision,
which turned on the distinction between the meaning of primary and secondary
liability. Most courts interpreted it to mean that an anti-fraud claim could be
brought against only the person making the fraudulent statement, not to those
assisting him or her in the fraud. For a discussion of this jurisprudence and an
argument that primary liability under Section 10(b) should extend to those who
participate in fraudulent conduct, even if they did not make a fraudulent
statement, see Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability, Federal Securities Fraud,
and John Wayne's i-Pod (Univ. of Tex. at Austin, McCombs Sch. of Bus.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. IROM-02-07, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.comabstract=lO14658.
Another theory of liability reaching
participants in a fraud other than the actual speaker, known as "scheme
liability," was based upon subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 and was
developed after courts began to limit the scope of primary liability under
subsection (b) of that Rule following the Central Bank decision. However, the
United States Supreme Court recently rejected this theory and refused to
impose liability under Rule 10b-5 beyond those making the materially false
statement (or omission). See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). Moreover, the "group pleading" doctrine,
whereby plaintiffs will plead that executives are responsible for misleading
statements that they did not directly make, is not widely accepted in securities
law jurisprudence and may no longer be good law after Stoneridge. See
Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 363-64 (5th

Cir. 2004); William 0. Fisher, Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie: The Rise
and Possible Demise of the "Group Pleading"Protocol in 10b-5 Cases, 56 Bus.
LAW. 991, 1049-53 (2001).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006). There is a comparable provision in the
Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2006).
125. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472-74 (2d Cir.
1996). This form of liability does not require knowing participation in the fraud.
See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 392-97 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
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an officer, director, or other agent. Organizational liability
here has to be based on the agent's misconduct, which leads
back to issues of individual intent and to the typical
pleading burdens for a third party lawsuit. 126 But
organizational liability can be a significant weapon in the
hands of the SEC and the DOJ to pursue organizational
corruption, the subject of the next subsections.
2. SEC's Prosecution of Organizations.The SEC is not
hampered by many of the limitations facing private
litigants relating to group prosecution. In an administrative
proceeding or a court action, it can pursue groups of
individuals engaged in fraud based upon aiding and
abetting, 127 and it does not have to establish scienter, since
it can bring an action under Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act on the basis of negligence. 128 It has a wide array of
sanctions against both individuals-it can impose upon
them almost quasi-criminal sanctions, such as barring them
from serving as officers and directors of public firms, 12 9and public firms-it can assess considerable fines against
them, 13 0 seek injunctions that can restrict and direct the
business of the firm, 131 and appoint a corporate monitor to
oversee the firm's business and compliance with the law. 132

126. See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked,
Homeless and Without Wheels" Corporate Fraud,Equitable Remedies, and the
Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627,
631-32, 649-50 (2007).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006). Moreover, it has been contended that the SEC
can bring actions against groups engaged in a fraudulent scheme (i.e., the
limitation on scheme liability discussed above does not apply to SEC
enforcement actions). See Rachel McTague, Securities Fraud Liability: Attorney

Says SEC May Retain Ability to Allege Scheme Liability, 6 Corp. Accountability
Rep. (BNA) 108 (Feb. 1, 2008).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006); see also Langevoort, supra note 126, at
652 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446, U.S. 680, 695-97 (1980)).
129. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2006). Professor Langevoort
suggests, however, that, in all but notorious cases, the SEC generally lets off
executives without great penalty and finds it easier to assess a fine against the
corporation. See Langevoort, supra note 126, at 654.
130. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d), 78u(d)(3) (2006) (granting the SEC the power
to impose three tiers of civil monetary penalties).
131. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d)(1) (2006) (granting the SEC authority to
bring judicial action seeking injunctions).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a) (2006) (granting the SEC injunction powers).
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Its large Enforcement Division investigates and brings civil
enforcement actions for violations of the securities laws by
participants in the markets, which would include public
firms.
More importantly, since the SEC's mandate is to
develop and safeguard the securities markets, it addresses
group and organizational misconduct and is concerned with
organizational reform. Certainly, judging from corporate
scandals surfacing in recent years, the SEC is not reluctant
to bring enforcement proceedings against organizations on
the basis of respondeat superior. The SEC seeks not only
restitution for investor losses, fines, and penalties, but often
requires (itself or through a corporate monitor) targeted
organizations to change their governance structure,
policies, and compliance procedures, among other things. 133
Indeed, the SEC's statements about the rationale for its
enforcement against organizations are the best place to
locate the SEC's understanding of the importance of group
and organizational factors upon senior-level misconduct.
There is no better place to look than the SEC's
statement on factors that it considers in determining
whether to bring an enforcement action against an
1 34
organization, which is known as the "Seaboard Release."'
The SEC issued the Release in a context typical of
organizational liability: the controller of Seaboard
Corporation had falsified books and records of the company
so that its SEC reports were materially inaccurate. Under
the principle of respondeat superior, Seaboard was liable
for the controller's fraud. However, the SEC determined not
to bring an action against Seaboard, given its conduct in the
matter. Upon learning of the misconduct, other senior
executives had immediately informed the board, launched a
preliminary and then a more thorough investigation (with

133. A recent example of SEC prosecution of, and settlement with,
organizations deals with the involvement of their agents in option backdating.
See, e.g., SEC v. Brooks Automation, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20,584 (May 19,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationflitreleases/2008/lr2O584.htm;
SEC v. Marvell Tech. Group, Ltd., Litigation Release No. 20,559 (May 8, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr2O559.htm.
134. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a), Exchange Act
Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 296 (Oct. 23, 2001). The Release dealt with
an employee of the Seaboard Corporation and never in fact mentions the firm
by name.
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an outside law firm), fired the controller and her immediate
supervisors, informed the SEC and the securities markets
about the fraud, fully cooperated with the SEC
investigation, and entirely revamped its financial reporting
processes. 135 The SEC observed that this self-reporting, selfrectification of the problem, and cooperation
saved SEC
136
enforcement and shareholder resources.
The SEC saw the Release as an opportunity to set forth
the criteria that it uses in determining whether to
prosecute an organization for the actions of its agents. The
criteria show that the SEC's views on organizational causes
of senior misconduct are out of step with the findings of the
social psychology and organizational literature, mainly
because the SEC considers misconduct as basically an
individual phenomenon. Admittedly, some of the criteria
are interesting from an organizational perspective. Under
the second criterion, the SEC asks how the misconduct
arose and continued, questioning whether it was "the result
of pressure placed on employees to achieve specific results,
or a tone of lawlessness set by those in control of the
company" and why existing compliance procedures did not
prevent it.137 Here, the SEC suggests that enforcement
against an organization is justified because of a corrupt
culture attributable to its leaders. This approach makes
sense in organizational terms because, as we have seen, the
literature emphasizes the importance of an organization's
leaders in maintaining the culture of the organization.
Similarly, under the third criterion, the SEC asks how high
up in the organization did participation in or knowledge (or
willful ignorance) of the misconduct occur and whether the
misconduct was systemic and characteristic of the firm (i.e.,
"symptomatic of the way the entity does business") or

135. See id. at 296.
136. See id. at 297.
137. See id. at 298. The first criterion is the state of mind involved in the
misconduct, ranging from an honest mistake to venality, which suggests that an
organization would likely be liable only for reckless or intentional fraud by its
agents, particularly if they misled the auditors. See id.
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isolated. 138 Again, the suggestion is that, if leaders are
involved in or condone misconduct, particularly systemic
misconduct, the SEC must make the organization itself an
enforcement target and reform it, if possible.
Yet, the next organizational enforcement criteria
identified by the SEC, which deal with self-reporting and
self-punishment, undercut the focus on organizational
attributes. After asking how the misconduct was discovered
and how quickly the company responded to it,139 the SEC
considers in its enforcement calculus the company's
remedial actions: whether the misconduct was stopped,
whether those involved still remain with the company,
whether the misconduct was promptly disclosed to the
public and to regulators, whether the company cooperated
with regulators and law enforcement personnel, and
whether it identified the losses caused and recompensed
those harmed. 140 Significantly, the SEC identifies in more
organizational
appropriate
constitutes
detail
what
cooperation: the firm hands over to the SEC the results of
its investigation, even pointing the SEC to additional
violations that have come to light, and asks (and compels)
its employees to cooperate with the investigationincluding waiving the attorney-client privilege or other
have as to the results of internal
privileges it might
investigations. 141

138. See id. The fourth criterion is also related since the SEC asks how long
the misconduct lasted (one quarter or several years) and whether it occurred
before the company went public (and thus was a basis for a fraudulent capital
raising). See id. The fifth criterion relates to the market's judgment: a
significant drop in the stock price. See id. Enforcement action against the
organization is justified if the market judges it as an untrustworthy entity and
one in need of reform.
139. Id. (criteria 6 & 7).
140. Id. at 298-99 (criterion 8). As additional criteria, the SEC evaluates
whether outsiders (meaning outside directors not involved in the misconduct),
assisted by law firms and forensic accountants that had not previously worked
for the firm, had supervised the investigation and decided upon the remedial
actions. See id. at 299 (criteria 9 & 10).
141. See id. (criterion 11). The SEC also considers whether the company
adopted internal policies and controls to ensure that the misconduct will not
recur. Id. (criterion 12). Its final criterion is whether the company is the same,
or whether it has merged or come out of bankruptcy, with the implication that a
transformed company should not be blamed for past faults. See id. (criterion
13).
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On the one hand, the SEC's approach as to selfreporting and self-reform is organizationally astute insofar
as it wants the company to demonstrate that it is viable
because its current senior decision-makers were not
involved in the misconduct. In organizational terms, this
helps ensure that those most associated with the corrupt
organizational culture are no longer with the firm and that
new leaders can take the firm in a new cultural direction.
On the other hand, the approach is weighted too much
towards individual, rather than organizational, liability. As
noted in the organizational literature discussion, it is
unlikely that sustained and widespread misconduct in an
organization, which reflects a corrupt organizational
culture, is ever entirely the creation of one or a few persons,
even senior executives, despite their importance in
maintaining and changing an organizational culture. 142
Thus, judging whether a firm should be prosecuted
primarily by whether it has investigated and expelled those
directly involved in the misconduct reinforces the view that
group and organizational factors are minor in misconduct.
Indeed, using as enforcement criteria a firm's cooperation
with regulators and law enforcement authorities-including
the waiver of privileges, and pressuring employees
themselves to cooperate (or be disciplined)-emphasize that
the firm (the proverbial "barrel") exists completely apart
from its executives and employees (some of whom may be
the "bad apples" in it), which flies completely in the face of
the organizational literature.
In the Release, therefore, the SEC presents a view of
public firms as either housing a few bad apples, who must
be identified and punished, or being entirely corrupt,
almost in the realm of a criminal enterprise. Since nearly
all public firms do not fall into the latter category, the
result is unsatisfactory from an organizational perspective,
for it means that the enforcement process will rarely focus
on group, organizational, and even industry factors in
misconduct. For a firm not to be prosecuted, and/or for it to
reach a settlement with the SEC, it must demonstrate that
new compliance policies and procedures have been adopted,
and a monitor may be charged with overseeing their

142. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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implementation. However, while necessary, such policies
and procedures are no substitute for organizational reform.
It may be that the SEC is doing the best that it can
under the circumstances, considering its institutional
position and resources, and it does not have a mandate to
change the organizational culture of U.S. public firms. The
best that it may be able to do with respect to group and
organizational factors in misconduct is to leave them to a
corporate
monitor to address,
after seeking the
appointment of such for an appropriately flawed firm. More
will be said on the proper role of the SEC regarding
organizational reform in Part III. This section simply
emphasizes that in its major pronouncement on
organizational liability, the SEC shows a flawed (albeit
understandable, given our cultural emphasis upon the
individual) understanding of the importance of group and
organizational factors in senior-level misconduct. 143
C. FederalProsecutionof Securities Law Violations
To inquire into federal prosecutors' recognition of group
and organizational influences on misconduct by senior
decision-makers is a daunting and inherently nonpromising task. The criminal law that is the focus here,
143. The SEC recently reaffirmed this position in a statement on assessing
financial penalties against organizations. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning
Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. It
issued the statement because of concern by firms about when it was likely to
assess a large financial penalty against a firm, again on the basis of misconduct
by corporate agents. The SEC observed that the penalty power, which came into
effect in 1990, was intended to penalize shareholders who gained from
misconduct, to deter corporations from engaging in certain kinds of misconduct,
and to push corporations to adopt compliance programs. See id. (referring to the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act and to
Sarbanes-Oxley's change that allowed funds from penalties to be used to
recompense injured investors). Again focusing on individuals, the SEC observed
that a penalty is appropriate when "responsible persons" have participated in
the offense in a pervasive way, although whether they have been removed from
the firm will weigh in the SEC's penalty decision. See id. The SEC also noted,
somewhat contradictorily, that fraudulent intent and difficulty of detection of
the fraud weigh in favor of a corporate penalty; if there is an extremely clever
fraudulent employee, should the entire organization suffer? As in the Seaboard
Release, the SEC asked whether the corporation has taken remedial steps to
address the fraud (i.e., new compliance procedures) and whether it reported the
offense and cooperated with the SEC and law enforcement authorities. See id.
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which is based upon securities law violations, is voluminous
because it has expanded in recent years as additional
crimes have been enacted as a result of the corporate
scandals. 144 Moreover, by definition federal prosecutors
generally discount group and organizational influences
since criminal liability is often based upon bad intent of the
individual. 145 They do pursue groups of senior executives, as
they do in other contexts. Indeed, a classic prosecutorial
move is to prosecute less significant participants in a
business scandal so that they will be "convinced" to take a
reduced sentence in a plea deal in return for implicating
146
their superiors.
There is, however, an area of federal prosecution that,
like the SEC's enforcement against organizations, is readymade for the analysis of group and organizational factors in
senior-level misconduct. This is the criminal liability of
business organizations, which are legal persons, for
securities law violations. 147 The basis for this liability is the
doctrine of respondeat superior under which an employer is
liable for the tortious acts of its employees that are done in
the course of the employer's business or that otherwise

144. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116
Stat. 745, 806 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. V 2005))
(subjecting executives to criminal penalties for false certifications of the
accuracy of their companies' SEC filings).
145. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 5.1 (2d ed. 2005).
146. Essentially, this has been the pattern followed in all of the corporate
scandals: prosecutors go after lower-ranking executives and then, through plea
deals, get them to act as witnesses against senior executives. See Samuel W.
Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1646-47
(2007). In the most famous of such cases, Andrew Fastow, who was arguably
one of the main architects of Enron's fraud, received a sentence of only six years
in comparison of the 24 years given to Enron's CEO Jeffrey Skilling, because
Fastow cooperated with the prosecutors. See Plea Agreement, United States v.
Fastow, No. H-02-0665
(S.D. Tex. Jan.
14, 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/enron/usafastowll404plea.pdf. There are
crimes that target group or concerted illegal activity, such as conspiracy, 18
U.S.C. § 371 (2000), wire and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. V 2005), and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act violations, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-63 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Supp. V
2005) (crime of attempt and conspiracy to commit criminal fraud offenses). But
in these cases, the prosecutorial focus must initially be on the individual, even if
he or she advances an illegal activity that is accomplished through a group.
147. The constitutionality of this liability has long been upheld. See N.Y.
Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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benefit the business. 148 Thus, if the agents of a business
organization engage in criminal securities law violations,
the organization may be criminally liable as well. 149 As in
tort, where the tortfeasing-agent is liable as well as the
organization, the individuals in a business firm who commit
the crimes are also prosecuted for their actions. 50
Naturally, a business firm cannot be imprisoned, but it can
be significantly fined.' 5' Not only might the fines be
massive enough to threaten an organization's continued
existence, but a business firm may be prohibited from
engaging in certain regulated activities and may suffer
significant reputation damage from the fact of an
indictment 52against it-whether or not the firm is eventually
convicted.

148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).

149. See N.Y Cent., 212 U.S. at 495-96. See generally Samuel W. Buell, The
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 474-76 (2006).
Scholars have contended that organizational criminal liability under respondeat
superior is extremely broad and federal prosecutors have considerable
discretion in applying it. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution,93 VA. L. REV. 853, 877-79 (2007); see also John Hasnas, Ethics and
the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 598-99 (2005) (stating
that prosecutors can attribute "group" intent to an organization through a
doctrine that considers that an organization has the collective knowledge of its
members). Although an organization may be criminally liable, moreover, it does
not have all the rights of an individual defendant. For example, it has no Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
74 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor,
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
150. In fact, it is rare to have a situation where the firm is prosecuted, but
not the individuals.
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (2000) (specifying fines for organizations guilty
of securities fraud). Nearly one-third of all criminal convictions of an
organization involve fraud and, of those convicted of fraud, nearly all receive a
fine and/or restitution. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.51-52 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.govl
ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm. The average restitution is $1,538,826 and the
average fine is $4,693,861. Id. at tbl.52.
152. This was the case with Arthur Andersen, even though its criminal
conviction was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). But see Buell, supra note 146, at 1664-66
(questioning evidence on the drastically adverse effects of an indictment of the
firm). For an example of collateral consequences of criminal indictment of firms,
see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)-(6) (2006) (suspension of broker-dealer as a result of
criminal conviction).
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As a result of the corporate and financial scandals at
the turn of the century, federal prosecutors have
particularly pursued business organizations. 153 Yet, rather
than indicting a public firm and taking it to trial, federal
prosecutors frequently defer prosecution or do not charge
the corporation at all-a deferred or non prosecution
agreement-provided that the firm agrees to certain
undertakings. 15 4 The DOJ's policies with respect to
organization prosecution (and decisions to defer or not to
undertake it) should help reveal its views on group and
organizational causes of senior-level misconduct, much in
the same way that the Seaboard Release did for the SEC. 155
Yet, a brief review of these policies, which is undertaken
153. Indeed, in July 2002, the DOJ formed, at the direction of President
George Bush, a Corporate Fraud Task Force to respond to the corporate
scandals. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/execorder.htm; see also CORP. FRAUD TASK
FORCE,

FIRST

YEAR

REPORT TO THE

PRESIDENT

iii

(2003),

available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/first-year-report.pdf. The renewed focus upon the
prosecution of business firms dates from that period. For a history of this
prosecution and the background to the prosecutorial policies to be discussed
below, see Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal
Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and
Practice,43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095 (2006).
154. See CORP. CRIME REP., CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF
DEFERRED
AND NON PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
(2005),
available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.comldeferredreport.htm;
Lawrence
D.
Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of
Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006); Candace
Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, CorporateDeferred ProsecutionsThrough the Looking
Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1 (2007-2008) (discussing a way to
address current absence of limitations on prosecutorial discretion with respect
to these agreements); see also Garrett, supra note 149, at 919-35 (reviewing
federal prosecution of business organizations that results in non prosecution
and deferred prosecution agreements, and arguing that this activity is subject
to little oversight from the judiciary or from anyone else).
155. Moreover, prosecutorial policies are significant, for, as is well known,
federal prosecutors decide to prosecute cases for various reasons; they cannot
prosecute all offenses by individuals or organizations. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE,

UNITED

STATES

ATTORNEYS'

MANUAL,

PRINCIPLES

OF

FEDERAL

PROSECUTION § 9-27.220 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao
/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220
(listing grounds
whereby federal prosecutors may decline to prosecute: no substantial federal
interest, subject to prosecution by another authority, and adequate noncriminal alternative to prosecution); id. § 9-27.230(A) (discussing federal
interest issue); id. § 9-27.250 (discussing non-criminal alternatives). The
guidelines for prosecuting business organizations are built upon these
principles.
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below, shows them to pay little attention to these causes. In
fact, the policies have been controversial primarily because
of the way in which organizational prosecution, or the
threat of this prosecution, has been used by federal
prosecutors to make a business firm a significant tool in the
prosecution of its culpable directors, officers, and other
employees. 156 If, as appears to be the case, federal
prosecutors use the prosecution of business organizations in
this way, they show that, in their view, misconduct of senior
decision-makers is primarily an individual, rather than a
group or organizational, matter.
1. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. Before
examining the most recent federal prosecutorial policies
concerning business organizations, it is necessary to refer
briefly to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which have a
chapter on organizational liability and sentencing. 157 By all

156. It is not necessary for me to describe in detail this development, which
has produced considerable practitioner and academic debate, although I shall
mention aspects of it below. For a description of federal prosecutors' "coercion"
of business organizations to facilitate prosecution of employees and the debates
concerning it, see Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, White Collar Crime:
Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 1, 2005, at 3; ABA TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT TO
THE
ABA
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
ON
AUDIT
ISSUES
(2006),
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/0806_report.pdf;
ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT TO THE
ABA
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
ON
EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS
9
(2006),
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclientlmaterials/hod/emprights-report-a
dopted.pdf; see also Buell, supra note 146, at 1618-22. In his article, Professor
Buell (a former Enron prosecutor) takes a pro-prosecutor position that there
may well be justifications for, and not a wholesale rejection of, some of the
pressures that federal prosecutors place on business organizations in this
context.
157. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2008), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2008guid/CHAP8.pdf. It appears that the discussion in an
earlier version of the Guidelines about determining the appropriate sentence for
corporations, and particularly about probation, influenced the DOJ's approach
to the prosecution of business firms. That is, the DOJ adopted a probationary
approach to business firms, if they wished to avoid prosecution. This resulted in
the deferred and non prosecution agreements whereby firms were overseen for a
set period of time, generally by a compliance monitor. See Finder & McConnell,
supra note 154, at 3-7. The Guidelines were amended in 2004, primarily as a
result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which required them to be enhanced to
address, among other things, organizational criminal liability. See SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805, 116 Stat. 745, 802 (2002)
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accounts, this chapter, which was the foundation for the
prosecutorial policies and was added in 1991, provides the
grounds for the imposition of a sentence on an organization
that is criminally liable. As in all parts of the Guidelines,
the chapter guides the sentencing judge's discretion by
enabling him or her to calculate an appropriate sentence
through first establishing a base offense level and then
adjusting it upward or downward as a result of factors
dealing with the offense, its effects, and the offender. The
Guidelines observe that the fine-the main form of
punishment of an organization-is determined by the
"seriousness of the offense," defined in terms of pecuniary
gain acquired from it, pecuniary loss caused, or otherwise
determined by the Guidelines, and then enhanced or
reduced by, respectively, aggravating or mitigating
factors. 158 The mitigating factors are "(i) the existence of an
selfeffective compliance and ethics program; and (ii) 159
reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility."'
The factor of an effective compliance and ethics
program is promising from an organization perspective
because it would appear to reward an organization for
having an appropriate organizational culture, and thus
underscore its significance in preventing individual
misconduct. Indeed, under the Guidelines, this program
should encourage personnel to "exercise due diligence to
prevent and detect criminal conduct" and "otherwise
promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical
160
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law."
This means that the organization has compliance standards
and procedures, the company's board is knowledgeable
about and exercises oversight over the program, at least one
member of "high-level personnel" (i.e., a director, officer, or
senior executive) is directly responsible for it, and there is
an adequate compliance staff operating the program and
reporting to the high-level personnel and the board about
the program and its effectiveness. 16 1 In addition, an

(reviewing federal sentencing guidelines for obstruction of justice and extensive
criminal fraud, clarifying 28 U.S.C. § 994).
158. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt.

159. Id.
160. Id. § 8B2.1(a).
161. See id. § 8B2.1(b)(i)-(2).
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effective program requires that an organization exclude
from authority positions individuals who have recently
engaged in illegal or unethical actions, conduct regular
training in the program for everyone in the organization,
monitor compliance with the program and regularly
evaluate its effectiveness, provide for confidential reporting
of legal and ethical violations, have a compensation
structure that rewards compliance with the program and
disciplines noncompliance,
appropriately respond to
criminal misconduct, including modifying the program as a
result, and conduct periodic assessments of risks of criminal
conduct in the organization and modify the program to
address them. 16 2 In sum, for this mitigating factor to apply,
ethics and legal compliance must be part of the fabric of the
business organization.
In contrast to this mitigating factor that focuses on
characteristics of the organization in an organization's
sentencing, other factors look to individuals. With respect to
aggravating factors, the Chapter recommends enhancing
the culpability for a large firm (one with more than 5,000
employees) if a director, officer, or senior executive
participated in the misconduct (or condoned it or was
willfully ignorant of it),163 or if tolerance of the offense by
supervisory personnel or persons with discretion in the firm
was pervasive in the organization.1 64 The rationale appears
to be that this misconduct reveals the lack of the necessary
professional management in the large business firm.16 5

162. See id. § 8B2.1(b)(3)-(7), (c).
163. Condoning means that "the individual knew of the offense and did not
take reasonable steps to prevent or terminate the offense." Id. § 8A1.2 cmt.
n.3(e). Being willfully ignorant means that "the individual did not investigate
the possible occurrence of unlawful conduct despite knowledge of circumstances
that would lead a reasonable person to investigate whether unlawful conduct
had occurred." Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(j).
164. See id. § 8C2.5(b)(1). For smaller organizations, the enhancement to
culpability is less on account of this participation. See id. § 8C2.5(b)(2)-(5).
Pervasiveness is measured, again, by the involvement of high-level and
supervisory personnel; it takes fewer instances of such involvement by a senior
executive to make the tolerance pervasive. See id. § 8C2.5 cmt. n.4.
165. The following quotation from the commentary to this part of the
Guidelines underscores the importance that the Guidelines place upon an
organization's management with respect to the amount of its liability:
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Moreover, the mitigating factor of an effective compliance
and ethics program is not available if a high-level person or
a significant unit in the organization participated in the
offense, or condoned it, or was willfully ignorant of it.166 The
message here is that, since professional, law-abiding, and
necessary
a
is
management
high-level
ethical
its
absence
firm,
for
the
public
characteristic
organizational
is a reason for enhancing, or at least not mitigating, the
firm's criminal sentence.
The other significant mitigating, or aggravating, factor
deals with the organization's cooperation in the prosecution
of the individuals engaged in the misconduct. The
organization's culpability is enhanced if it willfully
obstructed justice, or assisted in another's obstruction, or
failed to take steps to prevent such, all which could be

The increased culpability scores under subsection (b) are based on three
interrelatedprinciples. First, an organization is more culpable when
individuals who manage the organization or who have substantial
discretion in acting for the organizationparticipate in, condone, or are
willfully ignorant of criminal conduct. Second, as organizations become
larger and their managements become more professional, participation
in, condonation of, or willful ignorance of criminal conduct by such
management is increasingly a breach of trust or abuse of position.
Third, as organizations increase in size, the risk of criminal conduct
beyond that reflected in the instant offense also increases whenever
management's tolerance of that offense is pervasive. Because of the
continuum of sizes of organizations and professionalization of
management, subsection (b) gradually increases the culpability score
based upon the size of the organization and the level and extent of the
substantialauthoritypersonnel involvement.
See id. § 8C2.5. The culpability enhancement is reduced if a firm has a
compliance program, but only if no supervisory personnel were involved in the
violations or if there was no unreasonable delay in reporting the offense to
authorities. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
166. There is a rebuttable presumption of ineligibility if a lower ranking
executive did the same. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(B). Participation by high-level
personnel in the misconduct also raises the likelihood of probation for the firm if
the high-level personnel have been convicted of a similar criminal offense in the
preceding five years. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(5). Probation for the firm, which, for a
felony, can run from one to five years, includes supervision by the court, regular
inspection by and reporting to a court and a probation officer, and
establishment of an effective legal compliance and ethics program. Id. § 8D1.2-
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understood to be assistance to the culpable individual(s). 167
By contrast, its sentence would be reduced if it reported the
offense to authorities, cooperated with government
investigation and prosecution, and acknowledged its own
responsibility for the misconduct. 168 As in the Seaboard
Release, this focus on organizational cooperation in the
prosecution of its members reviews a perspective on
misconduct as being due to "bad apples." Although there
will certainly be situations where this is the case and where
an organization that opposes and cooperates in the
prosecution of individual misconduct should not be held
criminally liable for it, the organizational literature tells us
that the more common situation will be where the
organization and groups within it contribute to this
misconduct. The structure of the Guidelines, however,
encourages organizations, when faced with criminal
liability, to deny their responsibility (i.e., to assert that they
are not "bad barrels") by joining with the government in the
prosecution of individuals, especially senior decisionmakers, because the organizations cannot rely upon the
mitigating factor of an effective compliance program in this
case. This focus on individual culpability, rather than
organizational responsibility and reform, becomes acute in
federal prosecution of business organizations.
2. DOJ Approach on Prosecuting Organizations. The
Sentencing Guidelines laid the foundation for federal
policies on prosecuting organizations for the actions of their
agents. These policies became important at the turn of the
century as a result of the corporate scandals, which
involved violations of the federal securities laws. Like the
guidelines, these policies encourage prosecutors to view
organizations as either irremediably flawed (a rare
167. See id. § 8C2.5(e). See generally Hasnas, supra note 149, at 627 ("But
the Guidelines do much more than merely discourage organizations from
mounting a defense to charges brought against it as a corporate entity. To a
great extent, they turn organizations into an auxiliary in the prosecution of its
employees as individuals.").
168. This generally means pleading guilty to any charges. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8C2.5(g). As the Commentary states, "A
prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent information is
whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify
the nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the
criminal conduct." Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. n.12 (italics omitted).
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outcome) or irrelevant to the misconduct of the senior
to
demonstrates
An organization
decision-makers.
prosecutors that it falls into the second category-an
outcome in fact desired by the prosecutors-by assisting
them in going after individuals in the organization.
Accordingly, the prosecutorial policies downplay that an
senior-level
to
contributes
generally
organization
misconduct.
This perspective is demonstrated by the most recent
as
the McNulty
known
guidelines,
prosecutorial
169
first
The
Memorandum
Memorandum after its author.
169. See generally Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney
Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006),
at
http://www.usdoj.govldaglspeeches/2006lmcnulty-memo.pdf
available
[hereinafter McNulty Memorandum]. Basically, the Deputy Attorney General
who headed the DOJ's Corporate Fraud Task Force established guidelines for
the prosecution of business organizations. The first set was known as the
Thompson Memorandum after its author, and was the most controversial since
it emphasized that a firm had to cooperate with prosecutors to avoid
prosecution and that this cooperation included waiving important privileges,
including the attorney-client privilege and work product, and refusing to
advance defense expenses to targeted firm employees and directors.
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of
Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum]; see also Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting
Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys (Oct.
21, 2005), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.comlwhitecollarcrime-blog/
files/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf. Before the formation of the Task Force,
there were DOJ policies on prosecuting organizations, which the subsequent
guidelines built upon. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy
Attorney Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/
at
available
chargingcorps.html. The McNulty Memorandum replaced, and was issued in
response to the widespread dissatisfaction with, the Thompson Memorandum.
This latter Memorandum was strongly criticized in a case involving the
prosecution of former partners of the accounting firm, KPMG, which entered
into a deferred prosecution with the government. See United States v. Stein,
495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (indictment against certain KPMG
employees dismissed because of violations), and 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (prosecutors' conduct, based upon the Thompson Memorandum,
constituted a violation of the employee's Sixth Amendment right to counsel),
and 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 333-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (conduct coerced their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination). For a general discussion of the
evolution of these memoranda, see Crystal Joy Carpenter, Comment, Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations: The Thompson Memorandum and Its
Aftermath, 59 ALA. L. REV. 207 (2007); Daniel Bolia, McNulty Machine-Guns the
Thompson Memo: Death or Just a Flesh Wound? (Mar. 22, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980482.

2009]

RECOGNIZING THE "BAD BARREL"

offers what appears to be a valuable organizational
perspective, providing as its initial principle that
prosecuting corporations can change corporate culture, alter
corporate conduct, and punish and deter white collar
crime. 170 The Memorandum reasonably observes that
organizational liability is rarely a substitute for individual
criminal liability, for federal prosecutors must always
prosecute the individuals in business organizations if there
is evidence of their culpability.171
The Memorandum lists the factors for prosecutors to
consider in determining whether to prosecute an
organization.
Several
of these
factors
focus on
organizational characteristics: "the pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity
in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management" (factor 2), "the corporation's history of similar
conduct" (factor 3), disclosure of the wrongdoing and
cooperation in the investigation (factor 4), pre-existing
compliance programs (factor 5), and a corporation's
remedial actions (factor 6).172 It observes that an indictment
of an organization is appropriate where misconduct is
widespread in the organization, and condoned by

For a criticism that the McNulty Memorandum fails to provide any real
compliance guidance to corporations, see Miriam H. Baer, Insuring Corporate
Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1055-60 (2008).
170. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 2. The commentary to this
principle observes that prosecution of a business firm can have a massive
deterrence by altering corporate conduct in an entire industry as well as the
culture and conduct of a particular targeted firm. Id.
171. See id. This policy is different from the prosecutorial approach that
predates the recent orientation discussed in note 168, which approach was to
allow corporations to protect their employees in some cases often by taking the
blame for them (i.e., paying a fine). The Memorandum also sets forth the
theoretical basis for corporate liability, the theory of respondeat superior, and
explains that, for organizational liability, the agent must be acting in the course
of employment and, at least partly, for the benefit of the corporation. Id. at 2-3.
This agent activity that makes an organization liable is as sensitive an area in
criminal liability as it is in torts because an agent may be acting against the
policies of the firm, but may be still benefiting the firm by his or her actions,
which would justify prosecution of the firm. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.07 (2006). For example, if executives engage in fraud to keep a
company's stock price high, they may be acting against the company's policies,
but for its benefit, because it may need a high price to maintain its credibility in
the capital markets.
172. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 4.
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management, even if the instances of individual misconduct
are not great. 173 This points to the DOJ's astuteness, from
an organizational studies' perspective, of recognizing that
there may be a corrupt corporate culture that fosters
widespread misconduct, even if the Memorandum does not
spell out the relationship in theoretical terms, and that the
involvement of management, either in, or in the
acquiescence of, the misconduct, is critical to maintaining
this culture. 174
Certainly, firms with pervasive misconduct should be
prosecuted, and put out of business, but the problem is that
such firms are likely to be few in number. The
Memorandum thus highlights factors that allow the firm to
escape liability where it is not irremediably corrupt. As in
the Sentencing Guidelines, the existence of an effective
corporate compliance program is critical in this regard.
After observing that, as a legal matter, the existence of such
a program, which aids in the detection of individual
175
misconduct, does not relieve an organization of liability,
the Memorandum points out that its existence weighs
against an indictment of the organization if it is effective in
deterring and revealing misconduct, as opposed to being
"window dressing" that has no effect on the actual
operations of the firm.176
173. Id. at 6. The Memorandum acknowledges that there might be collateral
consequences (i.e., harm to innocent employees or shareholders) from
prosecution of the firm, and these consequences weigh against this prosecution.
But it explains that organizational corruption may be so widespread in the firm
that these consequences have little significance in the prosecution decision (and
that, in fact, the firm should be put out of business). See id. at 16-17. The DOJ
also considers whether it should defer to regulators like the SEC to punish an
organization. See id. at 17.
174. See id. at 6. This perspective agrees with the emphasis that
organizational research places upon the importance of management in defining
an organization's culture. See supra Part II.C. Admittedly, the DOJ
oversimplifies the relationship between management and corporate corruption,
as if it were unidirectional: culture is not entirely a creation of management,
but a collective creation. In a related point, the Memorandum reiterates that a
history of misconduct also points to a corrupt corporate culture, which is in
agreement with the organizational literature. McNulty Memorandum, supra
note 169, at 6-7.
175. Id. at 12-14.
176. Id. at 14 ("Prosecutors should therefore attempt to determine whether
a corporation's compliance program is merely a 'paper program' or whether it
was designed and implemented in an effective manner. In addition, prosecutors
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But, what if the compliance program has not been as
effective, as where senior executives prevented its use to
detect their own misconduct? Again, as in the Sentencing
Guidelines, the Memorandum points out that the
corporation's only course of action is disclosure of the
177
misconduct and cooperation in the investigation.
Cooperation here includes the controversial actions,
mentioned above, of requiring the firm to waive the
attorney-client and work product privileges. 178 The firm

should determine whether the corporation has provided for a staff sufficient to
audit, document, analyze, and utilize the results of the corporation's compliance
efforts. In addition, prosecutors should determine whether the corporation's
employees are adequately informed about the compliance program and are
convinced of the corporation's commitment to it."). On this point, the
Memorandum relies upon Delaware corporate law jurisprudence that requires
independent directors of companies to have an adequate supervisory system
providing them with information about officers' and other employees'
compliance with firm policies and the law. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l, Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
177. It justifies such disclosure and cooperation on the ground that
prosecutors need the disclosure and cooperation to understand the complexities
of the corporation's organization and decision-making. McNulty Memorandum,
supra note 169, at 7. The emphasis on cooperation first appeared in the
Thompson Memorandum. See Wray & Hur, supra note 153, at 1102-03. Firms
may willingly cooperate and self-disclose because, once a criminal problem is
revealed, these are the few actions that they can take to affect the prosecutors'
discretion. Firms cannot affect other factors considered by the prosecution. See
id. at 1171.
178. In response to the controversy, the Memorandum sets up a more formal
procedure for when a prosecutor can ask for a waiver: the federal prosecutor
must have a 'legitimate need" for the desired information in order to seek a
waiver, which also means that the prosecutor cannot obtain the information
elsewhere without the waiver, the company's voluntary disclosure is incomplete,
and the collateral consequences of a waiver to the corporation are not
significant. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 8-9. It counsels
prosecutors, when seeking a waiver, first to request purely factual information
(Category I) as to the underlying violation (e.g., copies of key documents,
witness statements, and factual summaries by company counsel), which "may
or may not be privileged." Id. at 9. If obtaining this information requires a
corporation to waive attorney-client privilege or work product protection, the
prosecutor must receive the approval of the local U.S. Attorney, who must
consult with the Assistant U.S. Attorney General for the Criminal Division in
granting it. Id. A corporation's failure to comply with this demand for the
waiver can be considered as non-cooperation with the investigation. Id.
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escapes prosecution by handing over, and assisting the
federal prosecutors in the prosecution of, culpable

Only if this factual information is inadequate for investigative purposes can
the federal prosecutor seek attorney-client communications or non-factual work
product (e.g., legal advice given to the corporation, or legal determinations
made by counsel as to an investigation) (Category I). Id. at 10. To request a
company to divulge this information, which request should be made only in
"rare circumstances," the applicable U.S. Attorney must obtain the written
authorization of the Deputy Attorney General. Id. If the corporation refuses to
waive its privileges, this refusal may not be considered in the prosecutor's
decision whether to charge the firm, although the prosecutor may take into
account, as cooperation, the corporation's willingness to waive. Id. Of course, a
corporation may voluntarily cooperate with the investigation and provide
privileged information without any government request. Id. at 11.
It remains to be seen whether the McNulty Memorandum will satisfy the
critics of the Department of Justice's prosecutorial policies with respect to
business organizations. A bill was introduced into the U.S. Senate to protect the
attorney-client privilege and attorney work product, among other things, by
prohibiting prosecutors from using waiver of the privilege or disclosure of work
product as a factor in a charging decision. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007). For the companion bill in the U.S.
House of Representatives, see H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007). If enacted, the bill
would bar many of the federal prosecutorial practices that criminal defense
attorneys have found objectionable (e.g., essentially prohibiting a corporation
from sharing information with a charged employee).
Moreover, to forestall legislation on the subject, the Deputy Attorney
General has recently stated that the McNulty Memorandum will be further
modified to address the concerns of critics. Letter from Mark Filip, Deputy
Attorney Gen., to Senators Patrick J. Leahy and Arlen Specter (July 9, 2008),
availableat http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/filipletter07O9O8.pdf.
Among other things, it will reflect that a corporation's cooperation is measured
by the timely disclosure of facts about the misconduct, not its waiver of
attorney-client or work product privileges. Id. at 2. Prosecutors also cannot
demand the Category II information (i.e., privileged information) as a condition
of a corporation's receiving cooperation credit. Id. In addition, prosecutors will
no longer consider whether a corporation has advanced attorneys' fees to
targeted employees in deciding whether it has cooperated with prosecutors. Id.
at 3. A corporation's cooperation will also not be evaluated in reference to
whether it has entered into a joint defense or similar agreement with other
persons (although prosecutors may ask the corporation not to disclose sensitive
information about the investigation to others) and to whether it has retained or
disciplined the employees in question (although its actions with respect to the
latter will be relevant to an evaluation of its remedial measures and compliance
program). Id. Moreover, after completion of this article, the DOJ revised its
corporate charging policies in line with Filip's explanation. See Press Release,
Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines for
Prosecuting Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2008/August/08-odag-757.html.
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individuals. 179 The firm shows that it has repaired itself by
having disciplined, and generally expelled, the employees
involved, no matter how senior, 180 and by accepting
and
responsibility, changing its compliance practices,
181
practices.
its
by
harmed
those
to
offering restitution
Thus, the structure of the Memorandum, as that of the
Sentencing Guidelines, is to compel a business organization
to align itself with the federal prosecutors against the
targeted individuals as a way of demonstrating that it is
not the kind of completely corrupt organization deserving of
prosecution. But, this emphasis serves to shift attention to
individual responsibility for misconduct and away from any
attention to, and exploration of, the organizational factors
that contributed to the misconduct. The Memorandum
acknowledges that a firm might need a complete
organizational reform, and it explains that this should be
part of a plea agreement (if a decision to charge has been
made). 8 2 But even here the focus is not on the substance of
the reform as on the prosecution of individuals, when the
Memorandum asserts that a plea agreement generally
cannot be a substitute for an indictment of the individuals
involved. 183
The reality of prosecutions of business organizations
reflects the substance of the Memorandum. Organizations
are rarely prosecuted, and when they are, the prosecution
has been used primarily as a way to reach individual
violators in an organization. After the backlash to the
prosecution of Arthur Andersen, federal prosecutors go out
of their way to avoid the collateral consequences of
organizational prosecution by entering into deferred
179. The message is that accused individuals should not be retained in, nor
assisted in their defense by, the firm. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169,
at 11-12. As a result of United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y.
2007), the DOJ did have to acknowledge that it was proper for firms to agree
beforehand to indemnify employees for litigation expenses, and to advance them
defense costs.
180. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 15.
181. Id. at 16.
182. These plea agreements were originally advocated by the Thompson
Memorandum. See Wray & Hur, supranote 153, at 1103-05.
183. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 169, at 18-19. This again has its
origin in the individualized focus of the Thompson Memorandum. See Wray &
Hur, supranote 153, at 1106.

62

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

prosecution or non-prosecution agreements with firms.' 8 4
As a result of these agreements, organizations cooperate in
the prosecution of their former executives and employees
and continue their organizational life. Organization reform
is stipulated in these agreements, which generally involves
the appointment of new executives, and a commitment to
take responsibility for the harm caused and to enhance
compliance and control procedures. Generally, a corporate
monitor is appointed for several years to supervise the
reform. 8 5 Organizational research would agree that new
leaders and enhanced compliance will aid in the creation of
an appropriate corporate culture. However, if the
prosecutorial focus is so much on individuals, one suspects
that the organizational reform is superficial, for it involves
what organizational studies tells us are the least effective
in creating an ethical culture-formal procedures and
oversight by an outsider. A flawed corporate culture is
likely to persist in a firm in the absence of any in-depth
attention to the organizational causes of the misconduct.
D. Taking Stock of Legal Approaches
The above targeted review of relevant laws and of their
enforcement and prosecution reveals that, by and large,
group and organizational causes or factors are given little
attention in corporate law jurisprudence, and by the SEC
and federal prosecutors in securities law enforcement.
Corporate law jurisprudence, the basis for public firm
governance, all but closed off its most promising avenue of
inquiry in the duty of good faith. Federal securities laws
reflect that disclosure is a group product and in their
enforcement of these laws against organizations the SEC
recognizes the significance of an organizational culture in
senior-level misconduct. But, the SEC uses the threat of
organizational liability to reach individual bad actors,
particularly high-level decision-makers, in the firm. Federal
criminal prosecution of business firms takes this approach
to the extreme. Prosecutorial policies on charging
184. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 154, at 16-17.
185. See Garrett, supra note 149, at 908-910; Wray & Hur, supra note 153,
at 1138-43. For an examination of the history and features of corporate
monitors, see Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007).
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organizations,
themselves
based
on organizational
sentencing guidelines, are written with individual liability
in mind, with the reform of organizations as an
afterthought. Once again, in organizational parlance, the
legal emphasis is on "bad apples" rather than "bad barrels."
What accounts for this resolutely individualistic focus
in the law and its enforcement with respect to senior
decision-maker misconduct? While no complete answer can
be given here, it is fair to say that this legal outcome is
over-determined by numerous factors. From a purely
psychological standpoint, this focus is another example of a
common human tendency to attribute complex social events
or phenomena-such as a massive corporate fraud-to
decisions or actions by individuals.18 6 The U.S. culture also
makes "natural" an individualist explanation of misconduct,
as well as good conduct, including in business
organizations. 8 7 Moreover, as noted previously, the
dominant view of conduct within business organizations is
that individuals, who are rational profit maximizers, alone
matter and that a business is a hierarchy of individuals.
From this perspective, misconduct requires an appropriate
punishment of culpable individuals that will also deter
other rational individuals who may be tempted to engage in
similar misconduct.188 In this context, it makes perfect
sense-and it is a goal that can be achieved-for the SEC

186. This is known as the fundamental attribution error. See BROWN, supra
note 21, at 169-94 (quoting Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL

SOCIAL
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(Leonard

Berkowitz

ed.,

1977));

HASLAM, supra note 26, at 48; PFEFFER, supra note 4, at 129-30; Ashforth &
Anand, supranote 62, at 37.
187. Indeed, the essentially highly individualist Judeo-Christian religious
traditions common in American society have no doubt added their weight to this
individualist perspective. This point about the connection between religion and
capitalist business, which is so prevalent in the United States, was made long
ago by Max Weber. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM 155 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
188. See supra note 51. It is interesting that even the "founder" of agency
theory, Michael Jensen, arguably feels that the economic approach has been
taken too far in business organizations and has been used to justify excessive
benefits for executives and financiers. See Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity
into Finance Theory and Practice: A Positive Approach, (Harvard NOM
Research
Paper
No.
06-06,
April
15,
2006),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=876312.
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and federal prosecutors to pursue the "responsible"
individuals.
To show how culturally ingrained this individualist
perspective on senior-level misconduct is, imagine one
alternative. Serious high-level misconduct occurs in a
business organization, which the SEC and/or federal
prosecutors pursue A la Arthur Andersen. The entire
organization is punished, which includes those actively
involved in the misconduct, those who, like superiors and
members of the immediate offenders' groups, knew about
and acquiesced in it, and those who, whatever their
positions, had no knowledge about or responsibility for it.
Justifications could be offered for this widespread
punishment: from this Article's social psychological and
perspective,
group and organization
organizational
by being part of the
contributed
to
the
misconduct
members
group and organization mindset or culture, at the very
least.1 8 9 Yet, this approach is jarring and seems primitive,
almost tribal, since one is punishing a group for the faults
of a few. 190 SEC enforcement personnel and federal
prosecutors take this approach only in unusual
circumstances where a business organization is seen to
have been organized for corrupt purposes (e.g., is a front for
the Mafia or a drug cartel) and thus it can be presumed
that all the individuals involved in it are corrupt. 191
Accordingly, the dominant legal-as well as business or
even societal-approach to senior-level misconduct in
business organization is the "bad apples" one: the direct
malefactors are prosecuted, as are executives (if they are
not the same) for their lack of supervision over those

189. From one social psychological perspective, working in a corrupt
organization might be seen to have an indelible influence upon the individual's
social identity, thus necessitating the widespread punishment. See John M.
Darley, Social Organizationfor the Productionof Evil, 3 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 199,
208-11 (1992) (arguing that socialization to evil occurring in a firm can
irreparably corrupt individuals). To be frank, I have adopted this kind of
approach in the past. See Fanto, supra note 11, at 502.
190. Indeed, social psychologists suggest that this approach is often taken
when ingroup members consider actions towards members of an outgroup. See
HASLAM, supra note 26, at 30.
191. The approach of the Sentencing Guidelines in this case is to impose a
large enough fine on the organization essentially to put it out of business. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. at 487 (2008).
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involved in the misconduct. The law (i.e., the SEC and
federal prosecutors) assumes that other organization
members who are not directly involved in the misconduct
will go on as before, although often with new leaders. 192 To
the prosecution of certain individuals and the replacement
of leaders are added organizational reforms, but this just
means that the organization must adopt reformist policies
and procedures, statements of value, and ethics codes, and
enhance its compliance and monitoring. If the misconduct
was particularly serious, or if there is some continuing
suspicion about past leaders who remain in place, an
outside monitor may be appointed for a limited period to
ensure that the organization's members, particularly its
leaders, do not return to their old ways. 193 This formal and
surface reform, however, does not take the group and
organizational causes of misconduct seriously.

III. ENHANCING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL SOPHISTICATION
The current state of affairs in corporate and securities
law, as discussed in the preceding Part, should be reformed
to reflect the group and organizational causes of senior
decision-maker misconduct. There are reasons for this
reform. As noted at the beginning of this Article, it is
inequitable for senior decision-makers, in the absence of
something like intentional fraud on their part, to shoulder
most of the punishment for organizational practices and
culture that are not their creation. 194 Although
organizational researchers see senior decision-makers as
having a significant role in defining the culture of their
192. This view is reinforced by the social psychological tendency not to
blame individuals for their failure to act, but only for their acts. See JONATHAN
BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 200-201 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the "omission

bias").
193. A good example here is Bristol-Myers, where a monitor was appointed
because of organization corruption at a senior level. Ultimately, the monitor
removed the CEO and chief legal counsel on account of new misconduct by
them. See John Carreyou & Barbara Martinez, Board Members at BristolMeyers Told to Fire CEO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at Al. This is reminiscent
of what was done with Germany and Japan in World War II (and even Iraq
today): new leaders watched by occupying monitors took over and no effort was
made to condemn all individuals in the defeated countries.
194. See supra Part I.
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firm, given the hierarchical setting of U.S. business, they
believe that it is mistaken to attribute this culture and195
any
misconduct arising from it entirely to these individuals.
This may be a difficult justification for reform, given
the excessive compensation of senior executives in public
firms.196 In fact, they are the paragons of the self-interest
ideology: they demonstrate how the ideology encourages
individuals to set no bounds to their acquisitiveness.
Moreover, as noted earlier, they face insignificant risks of
personal liability, whether under corporate law or even
securities law enforcement and federal prosecution, even
though at times individual executives became scapegoats
for an entire organizational scandal. In other words, why
should we be concerned if, to take only one example, Jeffrey
Skilling, former CEO of Enron, took more blame for Enron's
scandal than he deserved? 197 This small risk of
extraordinary liability goes hand in hand with the
extraordinary compensation. Indeed, to make an argument
for decreasing the liability or prosecution risk for senior
executives would be to participate in the current movement
to roll back Sarbanes-Oxley for their benefit. 198
Rather, the more convincing justification for reform has
to be organizational and social, not individual. The basic
argument is that, unless the law recognizes the group and
organizational
factors
in
senior-level
misconduct,
organizational reform will be superficial and will not
address the culture and practices that contributed to the
misconduct. Without a more socially and organizationally
sensitive reform, misconduct will resurface in an
organization, despite the existence of new leaders. This

195. See supra Part II.B.1.
196. For a general discussion of executive compensation and market failings
that lead to its excessiveness, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).

197. Skilling was sentenced to 24 years and four months in prison. See John
R. Emshwiller, Skilling Sentenced to 24 Years in Prison for Role in Enron
Collapse, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2006. Andrew Fastow, its former CFO and
arguably the architect of the fraud, received a sentence of only six years in
prison and two years of community service, primarily because he cooperated in
the prosecution of Skilling.
198. On this movement, see James Fanto, A Social Defense of SarbanesOxley, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 518 (2007/08). Admittedly, the voices for this
reform have fallen silent during the financial crisis now gripping the country.
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Part thus considers the possibilities of reform within the
legal areas already examined and the impediments to it.
The analysis also considers the problem posed in each legal
area by the larger issue of the self-interest ideology.
A. AbandoningAll Hope for CorporateLaw Reform
As discussed earlier,
Delaware corporate
law
jurisprudence shut off the most promising development for
recognizing group and organizational factors: the duty of
good faith. One could certainly spend time speculating
about how this duty could be expanded to impose an
obligation upon a member of a group or organization for its
flawed dynamics, if they result in damage to the
corporation. For the board member, this could mean that he
or she would be responsible for dysfunctional board
dynamics, for example, one that routinely accedes to a
dominant leader, even if the board otherwise satisfies its
duty of care to make informed decisions. Even more
generally, a revised duty might demand that a board
member have reasonable grounds for believing, not only
that the corporation have legal and ethical compliance
codes and policies, but also that the organization have in
fact an appropriate culture to deter misconduct. This would
require directors to be informed about and to monitor
organizational practices, not simply to rely upon compliance
systems.
It is questionable whether it is worthwhile, although it
is interesting, to engage in this speculation if it is
unlikely-which is the case-that the Delaware courts will
ever go along with this jurisprudential suggestion. What
are the reasons for this pessimism? As noted earlier, the
Delaware courts reflect business reality in their
jurisprudence and are reluctant to offer any perspective
that runs against it. Despite the legal structure of corporate
governance, these courts recognize that, in reality, directors
are secondary to executives and especially to the CEO. They
are thus reluctant, under the rubric of good faith or
otherwise, to find directors liable for anything to do with
the firm. Moreover, the courts have learned their lesson
from Smith about expanding liability for directors; the state
legislature is ready to reverse this kind of decision by
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changing the law. 199 Furthermore, as noted throughout this
article, legal responsibility for corporate affairs ultimately
reflects a culture that espouses individual responsibility.
Thus, courts focus their jurisprudential analysis upon the
conduct of an individual executive, as opposed to a group
within the firm or the firm itself, when misconduct occurs
because this focus seems "just right" to them (and to us).
Self-interest also plays a role as, to put it crassly,
Chancery Court judges do not want to jeopardize the
lucrative "Of Counsel" or other positions with a corporate
law firm in Delaware or New York that await them once
they leave the bench. 200 As noted previously, the application
of the self-interest ideology is nuanced because it is selffulfilling: when individuals are formed in it, they model
their conduct upon it so as to create the necessary
psychological harmony between their views and conduct.
Delaware judges and justices were themselves trained in
this ideology and, as frequent guest speakers at elite law
schools, have this training reinforced by the law and
economics model that dominates business law scholarship
at these schools and that is squarely built upon that
ideology. 20 It is no surprise, then, that they apply the
ideological model in their jurisprudence and in their
professional lives.
In addition, a main assumption of this Article is that
human beings have social and organizational identities as
well. Thus, any innovations in the Delaware corporate law
jurisprudence must be in line with these identities of the
judges. The Delaware legal community, of which they are
199. That is, they understand that the state legislatures will quickly move
to protect the corporate establishment. Moreover, there is always the threat
that corporations will move their legal seat from Delaware if its laws are
unduly burdensome to the corporate elite. On these issues, see Mark J. Roe,
Delaware's Competition (Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 49, 2008),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=354783.
200. For example, the well-known former Chancellor of Delaware, William
T. Allen, is a law professor at New York University and Of Counsel to the law
firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, the premier law firm defender of the
&
Katz,
Lipton,
Rosen
See Wachtell,
establishment.
corporate
http://www.wlrk.com (follow "Attorneys" hyperlink; then follow "View by Name"
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 5, 2008).
201. As a demonstration of this, one has simply to note the presence of law
and economics centers or institutes at the "top" law schools (e.g., Harvard, Yale,
Columbia, and Stanford).
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among the chief representatives, values the preeminence of
Delaware law for public corporations and the law's current
approach, which is ultimately based upon a nonand
with
business
arrangements
interference
perspectives. 20 2 Under social identity theory, the judges are
leaders of this community and thus prototypical of it.
Therefore, their legal views are highly constrained and they
will be unlikely to acknowledge a model that looks beyond
the individual to social and organizational factors in
misconduct.
B. The Promises and Limitations of Securities Law and
SEC Enforcement
What about federal securities law and SEC
enforcement? Although here reform to recognize group and
organizational factors is more promising than in the case of
corporate law, serious limitations exist. 203 Congress is
reluctant to make being a public company more costly at a
time when the U.S. capital markets are perceived to be
losing out to international competition. 204 Even in dire
circumstances-which are those of today-law reform
directed at public companies will likely have an individual

202. On the corporatist mentality of the Delaware judiciary, see Lawrence
A. Hamermesh, Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley Governance Issues: The Policy
Foundationsof Delaware CorporateLaw, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2006).
203. Although it has not been the focus of the Article, little can be expected
from private securities lawsuits. As noted above, courts have rejected doctrines,
such as scheme liability and group pleading, which would acknowledge that
fraud is a group or organizational product and which, if implemented, might
encourage directors and executives to take responsibility for their groups and
organizations with dysfunctional dynamics that condone, or are engaged in,
misconduct.
204. On current complaints about how federal securities laws are hurting
our capital markets, see, for example, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION,
INTERIM REPORT 5 (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
THE
11.30Committee_Interim ReportREV2.pdf.
See
also COMM'N ON
REGULATION OF THE U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
available
at
REPORT
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
6-7
(2007),

http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0703capmarketscomm.htm
(follow "Download the full report" hyperlink); SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
U.S.' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP

13-17

(2007),

available at

http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny-report-final.pdf (report commissioned by
New York City mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Senator Charles E. Schumer).
Again, these voices have fallen silent during the current crisis.
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focus, as was the case in Sarbanes-Oxley with its punitive
measures against CEOs.205
The SEC's enforcement and other powers are more
promising with respect to reforms dealing with group and
organizational factors. The SEC could highlight group and
organizational causes of senior-level misconduct in its
enforcement actions, which could be a forum to raise these
issues as well as the kind of group and organizational
reform needed to address the misconduct. Since the SEC
can pursue organizations in these actions, it could place
equal emphasis on organizational reform through
settlements or judgments as upon prosecuting individual
bad actors. Now the focus is on an organization's assistance
in the investigation of employees; the SEC hands off
organizational reform to the limited term corporate monitor
who has an often superficial mandate. The SEC could insist
upon a more thorough organizational reform as a condition
to settlement: one thinks of the all-encompassing
institutional reform undertaken by the corporate monitor in
WorldCom, where even executive compensation contracts
needed the monitor's approval and the monitor made an
effort
to produce an entirely different kind of
20 6
organization.
Moreover, the SEC might even bring the issue of
organizational reform to the forefront in its market
regulation activities, particularly in company disclosure.
Although the SEC's jurisdiction over companies primarily
involves their disclosure to the securities markets, it is well
recognized that, as a result of this disclosure and SarbanesOxley's enhancement of its powers, it has indirect
jurisdiction over companies' corporate governance and
organization. To take only one example of possible reform,
the SEC now requires public companies to disclose whether
they have legal compliance programs and ethical codes-

205. See generally James Fanto, PaternalisticRegulation of Public Company
Management: Lessons from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859, 890-95 (2006).
206. See RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S.
RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. (Aug. 2003),

available
at
http://www.thedirectorscollege.com/images/downloads/Breeden
Report Restoring Trust.pdf (describing the policies of creating a new
organization).
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and if they have no such code, they must explain why. 20 7 At
the very least, it could introduce disclosure requirements
about the effectiveness of these programs and codes in
creating an organizational culture that deters misconduct,
as opposed to just disclosure about their existence. This
approach would be in line with the SEC's introduction of
more qualitative, principles-oriented disclosure in company
208
disclosure and thus would be familiar to companies.
Certainly, the SEC would have to give guidance to
companies on this disclosure so that it would require them
to do more than offer the kind of empty platitudes about
ethical conduct that they provide now in annual reports and
to demonstrate the effectiveness of their policies with
reference to actions and results. 20 9 The SEC now provides
for this kind of "results" disclosure when it requires
companies rapidly to disclose and discuss amendments to or
waivers of their codes of ethics as to executive officers. 210 As
it does for any new item of disclosure, through the rulemaking process it would engage in a dialogue with the stock

207. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2008); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §
406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006). Although the SEC imposes only disclosure
requirements, stock exchanges make the codes mandatory. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK
EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.10 (Nov. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html.
208. For example, it recently revised the entire approach to executive
compensation disclosure, with the purpose of having companies discuss, in a
new Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of an annual report, their
overall policies on and approach to executive compensation. See 17 C.F.R. §
229.402(b)(1)(vi) (2008) (requiring company to discuss "[h]ow each compensation
element and the registrant's decisions regarding that element fit into the
registrant's overall compensation objectives and affect decisions regarding other
elements"); Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Securities
Act Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27,444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006).
209. Again, this is the goal of the reforms to the executive compensation
disclosure: to link actual compensation decisions and results to policies and
principles.
210. They must make this disclosure on Form 8-K, which is for disclosure of
special events and which must be filed within four business days of the
occurrence of the event, or on the company's web site in the same time frame.
See Form 8-K, General Instructions B.1 & Item 5.05, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2008).
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exchanges, companies, and other interested parties to
develop this disclosure. 211
Yet, recently the pendulum has swung against SEC
organizational enforcement, leaving it to focus upon "bad
apples" and to use the threat of organizational liability to
enlist the organization in this task.212 As in the case of the
Delaware judiciary, the SEC and its staff face personal,
social, and organizational pressures that militate against a
reform that would recognize group and organizational
factors in misconduct. Again, many of its members accept
the self-interest perspective on business institutions and
conduct, living as they do in the financial world; this is part
of their own social and organizational identity. It is
completely natural for them, moreover, to use their
expertise to move into the private sector and not to want to
be known for having radical views on business and financial
organizations, which would impede this movement. 2 13 In
addition, there are institutional obstacles for the SEC to
champion broad organizational reform. It is, after all, an
agency of limited resources, which are not even enough for
it to pursue the numerous "bad apples" operating in the
investment markets. As noted earlier, the SEC also faces

211. Moreover, the SEC also regulates firms, such as broker-dealers and
investment advisers, and has direct powers over their governance and
organizational structure. With the help of the self-regulatory organization for
broker-dealers, the Financial Institution Regulatory Authority (FINRA), for
example, it could develop and mandate substantive reforms to address
organizational culture, and these reforms could serve as models for public
companies. On the extent of the SEC's and FINRA's regulation of brokerdealers, see generally POSER & FANTO, supra note 49, at 4-1 to 4-51.
212. This retreat is exemplified by an SEC decision to require the
Commission itself to pre-approve the range of financial penalties that could be
sought in settlement by the Enforcement Division in an action against a
particular public corporation, as opposed to its previous policy of allowing that
Division to propose the appropriate settlement. See Christopher Cox, Chairman,
SEC, Address to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy
Conference (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http:/www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2007/soch0412-2cc.htm.
213. A notorious example of this involves the SEC's investigation of John
Mack, now CEO of Morgan Stanley, for insider trading. The SEC investigator
was deterred by senior SEC staff members from pursuing the investigation and
ultimately fired. One of the senior staff members sought a position with the law
firm for Mack's counsel at the same time. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN. & S.
COMM ON THE JUDICIARY 110TH CONG., THE FIRING OF AN SEC ATTORNEY AND THE
INVESTIGATION OF PEQUOT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 28 (Comm. Print 2007).
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the constant concern about the continuing viability of the
U.S. capital markets. This concern is emotionally charged
because it suggests that the status quo of U.S. dominance in
this sector is being lost. 214 Finally and significantly, there is
the issue of expertise and competence:
if SEC
Commissioners and staff have competence in any
disciplines, these are accounting, finance, and business
law-the latter with its law and economics foundation-not
in social psychology, organizational studies, and related
fields that provide a basis for the necessary reform.
C. Reform of OrganizationalProsecution
Finally, reform of federal criminal prosecution of public
companies and senior-level decision-makers that is based
upon securities law violations is at once both problematic
and necessary. It is problematic because requiring
prosecutors to consider social and organizational factors in
misconduct runs counter to the entire orientation of
criminal law that prosecutors apply, which is built upon
individual mens rea. If, moreover, the SEC is limited in its
resources
and competence
to conduct
meaningful
organizational reform, the same is even truer for the DOJ
and federal prosecutors, which have no mandate to oversee
the operation of business organizations and whose
prosecutorial resources cannot reach even all individual
violators. Furthermore, politicians, the media, and the
general public, all subject to the fallacy of attributing
complex problems to individuals, put considerable pressure
upon prosecutors to identify and to punish individuals
responsible for corporate and financial scandals. And, of
course, the self-interest of prosecutors will always tempt
them to accede to this pressure by making a reputation,
which can be translated into financial and political rewards,
215
for instigating notable prosecutions of senior executives.
But, the answer is not to abandon organizational
criminal liability. To do so would be to reaffirm that seniorlevel misconduct is only a matter of "bad apples." If, as is
214. See supranote 204.
215. The most notable example is Rudolph Giuliani, who parlayed his
position as a U.S. Attorney who prosecuted business crimes into a political
career. See generally DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY
MICHAEL MILKEN AND His FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 98-102 (1996).
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clear, organization and group factors contribute to this
misconduct, it is necessary that they be addressed. 216
Organizational criminal liability must be maintained
because it is societal acknowledgement of this social and
organizational truth and because it is one of the few tools
that allow society, through prosecutors and regulators, to
address
group
malfunctioning
and
pathological
organizational culture. 217
Clearly, however, the way organizational prosecution is
currently conducted has to change. Strong arguments can
be made that businesses need to cooperate in the
prosecution of individual executives and others.218 However,
using prosecution of the organization only to reach
individuals in it may injure the organization itself, as
employees lose faith in the organization to represent their
interests. 219 That is, an organization that joins with

216. See, e.g., Ashforth & Anand, supra note 62, at 39 (contending that a
corrupt organization needs a complete overhaul by outsiders, for corruption will
have become so much part of the routine that those in the organization often do
not even see their behavior and attitudes as corrupt).
217. This position contrasts with that of scholars who wish, for varying
reasons, to abolish or to limit organizational liability. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra
note 149, at 631-55 (arguing that organizational liability makes no sense under
the standard liberal justifications for criminal liability and that it often forces
an organization to act in unethical ways); Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate
World Mandates a "Good Faith"Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537
(2007) (arguing that the new emphasis on corporate criminal liability requires
that corporations be allowed a defense that they acted in good faith in setting
up and maintaining a compliance program); Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9
(contending that, where organizational liability would have serious collateral
consequences, prosecutors should make special efforts to prosecute only the
individuals responsible). For references to standard criticisms about
organizational liability, see Buell, supra note 149, at 475 nn. 8-14. Professor
Buell makes an argument related to mine insofar as he contends that
organizational prosecution is necessary because the "blaming" function of it
helps to transform organizations.
218. Professor Buell convincingly contends that this cooperation is
necessary in light of the fact that fraud in large organizations is difficult to
detect and to understand. See Buell, supranote 146, at 1625-27.
219. Professor John Hasnas makes this point forcibly, arguing that
corporate compliance programs and cooperation with prosecutors mandated by
the Sentencing Guidelines and prosecutorial guidelines like the McNulty
Memorandum run counter to organizational research as to the best ways of
deterring unethical and illegal behavior, such as making people identify with
the organization. See John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance:
Conflicting Demands of Law and Ethics 13-21 (Georgetown Public Law
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prosecutors only in order to avoid being itself prosecuted
undermines the confidentiality, trust, and openness of its
employees. Moreover, if the prosecution of an organization
results in a deferred or non prosecution agreement with a
fine, surface compliance changes, and a monitor to oversee
the implementation of policies and codes, it presents only
superficial reform without ever reaching the fundamentals
of organizational behavior that led to the misconduct. 220 As
weak
organizational theorists have observed, having a 221
ethical program may be worse than having none at all.
Accordingly, reforming an organization cannot be
treated as an afterthought in federal prosecution of
organizations. It makes sense for the DOJ to continue its
current policy of preferring deferred or non prosecution
agreements to organizational prosecution and conviction,
for it is impossible as a practical matter in our culture to
put "innocent" employees out of work from this prosecution
and conviction. However, it is possible for the DOJ and
to
to give more importance
federal prosecutors
with
agreements
in
their
reform
organizational
organizations. For reasons of its lack of institutional
at
available
2007),
1020101,
No.
Paper
Research
http://www.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1020101.
220. This conclusion is underscored by the DOJ's recent "formalization" of
its corporate monitor policy, which was done in response to criticisms that the
DOJ was appointing former U.S. Attorneys to these lucrative positions. On
these criticisms, see Steven R. Peiken, New Guidelines for CorporateMonitors,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 27, 2008, at 4. This memorandum lists principles that should be
followed in the appointment and conduct of monitors (several of them are
designed to address the issue of former DOJ officials receiving these
appointments). Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney
Gen., Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and
Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf. The third
principle, in particular, observes that the primary purpose of the monitor is to
ensure compliance with that part of the agreement dealing with the recurrence
of misconduct in the corporation. Although the monitor is not empowered to
investigate past misconduct (fourth principle) and his or her appointment is
limited in duration to ensuring that the firm has rehabilitated itself (eighth
principle), the monitor is to report previously undisclosed misconduct or new
misconduct to the government (seventh principle) and can in fact communicate
separately with the government at its discretion (fifth principle). In other
words, while separate from the DOJ, the monitor is, for all practical purposes, a
DOJ representative who must keep his or her eyes open for misconduct, rather
than a specialist in organizational reform.
221. See Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 71, at 304.
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competence and limited resources, the DOJ would not be
expected to enhance or to develop its own role in this
reform. 222 When prosecuting, and arriving at settlements
with, organizations with respect to securities matters, it
generally works together with the SEC's Enforcement
Division. The DOJ could add its support, through
coordinated settlements, to reforms proposed by the SEC,
which, as discussed in the previous section, is better
situated to propose responses to industry-wide and firm
specific practices that contributed to the senior-level
misconduct. 223 A settlement responding to prosecution,
moreover, helps rehabilitate the organization in the eyes of
society by having it publicly acknowledge its wrongs, accept
appropriate punishment, and undertake reform. 224 Yet, the
nagging
problem
of what constitutes appropriate
organizational reform and who has the competence to
propose it remains, even if the DOJ and the SEC can be
lined up behind it.
D. The Role of Social Psychologists and Organizational
Scholars
A central problem for appropriate reform is that, for the
most part, social psychology and organizational learning
are at the periphery of business law scholarship in the
United States and thus not well known to legal
practitioners. It is little wonder, then, that the SEC and the
DOJ do not recognize group and organizational factors in

222. Cf. Trevifio et al., supra note 56, at 146-47 (contending that, given their
disciplinary focus, lawyers are not particularly well suited to design and
manage an appropriate compliance and ethics program and that this role
belongs to someone with operational responsibilities).
223. See Wray & Hur, supra note 153, at 1186-87.
224. See Michael D. Pfarrer et al., After the Fall: Reintegratingthe Corrupt
Organization, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 730 (2008) (presenting a theory of this
reintegration based upon legitimacy theory, i.e., that, to be reintegrated, an
organization must recover its legitimacy, and explaining that, to do this, the
organization must pass through four stages: (1) revealing the wrong, (2)
explaining it, (3) receiving punishment, and (4) rehabilitating itself as well as
dealing with certain factors (e.g., salience of the organization, repeated
violations) that could retard or stop altogether the reintegration); see also
Anand et al., supra note 44, at 20-21 (concluding that this kind of reintegration
can generally be accomplished in a seriously flawed organization only through
the intervention of an external party).
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senior-level misconduct nor use social psychological and
organizational literature in thinking about organizational
reform. One has only to contrast this situation with the
influence of economics and financial economics. Not only
are economists on the SEC's staff, but financial economists
follow closely financial regulation (read broadly to mean
legislation and agency rules) and its enforcement and their
225
work often inspires the SEC staff and prosecutors.
Moreover, law professors in the business and financial
areas are conversant with the work of financial economists,
and do similar research themselves, and thus their own
direct and indirect dialogues with legislators and regulators
reinforce the economic perspective. But these disciplines
have little to say about group and organizational factors in
misconduct, given that they are built upon a rational actor
model.
How can this situation be remedied? Certainly, law
professors in business and financial law could become
familiar with the relevant social psychological and
organizational research and suggest how it can be used in
law and regulation pertaining to organizational reform.
is
That approach is obviously the goal of this Article, which 226
part of a trend of organizationally-influenced scholarship.
However, it should be recognized that this trend must
overcome group and organizational factors in business law
scholarship. That is, as noted above, those with an economic
and financial economic orientation control the discipline's
225. The most notable recent example of this contact concerns stock option
backdating, which led to numerous SEC enforcement actions and federal
prosecutions. See supra notes 30, 133. The investigation into this practice was
started because of an article by a financial economist. See Erik Lie, On the
Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005).
226. For an example of this alternative approach, see James A. Fanto,
CorporateMisbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers Symposium: Perspectives from
Law and Social Psychology, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005) (symposium designed
to promote conversations between social psychologists, organizational scholars,
philosophers, and law professors). See also The Business Firm as Social Entity
at Brooklyn Law School's Center for the Study of Law, Language and Cognition,
http://www.brooklaw.edu/centers/cognitionl (last visited Dec. 5, 2008) (an online
course/resource to be used in law schools, among other places, to promote the
use of social sciences, other than economics, in business law studies). For a
similar approach to organizational corruption that also proposes to alter the
orientation of the SEC and the DOJ, see David Hess & Cristie L. Ford,
Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings:A New Approach to an Old
Problem, CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
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research agenda and dominate its hierarchy and, like all
groups, seek to reproduce themselves at the expense of
scholars with other perspectives, particularly approaches
based upon disciplines that are in a contentious
relationship with economics.
Yet law professors, who are, with a few exceptions, not
social psychologists or organizational theorists, cannot
alone undertake the work of promoting organizational
learning and translating it into policy guidance 173r
legislators and regulators. Researchers in these disciplir.,s
have to bring their knowledge of group and organizational
factors in senior-level misconduct (and other subjects, such
as the design of organizational reform) to the forefront,
which means making connections with the legal academy
that can prove useful in translating the knowledge into law
and regulations. In other words, they must compete with
economists and financial economists in public policy
debates over regulation of business and finance. All too
often, however, by all reports they have been reluctant to be
assertive in bringing their learning to the public and have
even allowed economists to, dominate227the institutions (i.e.,
the business school) where they work.
In the short term, to the extent possible legal scholars
in business and financial law have to bring social
psychological and organizational research to the legal policy
debates, and even to urge scholars in these fields to be
directly involved in on-the-ground corporate reform as well.
An example of this application would be the organizational
reform of a corporation where a major scandal occurred and
where the firm itself is the target of federal criminal
prosecution and SEC enforcement. The current practice of a
deferred prosecution agreement and appointment of a
corporate monitor could be continued; a monitor need not be
an organizational studies professor, any more than he or
she should be a former prosecutor. But just as monitors
engage management consulting firms, accounting firms,
and law firms to help them perform their appointed tasks of
revising a firm's business, financial, and accounting
practices, they should have the power to engage in serious
organizational reform and be allowed to appoint an

227. I owe this insight to Professor John Conley of the University of North
Carolina law school, who is a law professor and a trained anthropologist.
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organizational expert to study the group and organizational
factors that contributed to the misconduct and to make
recommendations that would eliminate them. Certainly, if
there is a demand for their expertise, organizational
scholars will be forced onto the public stage and may even
begin to form consulting arrangements with the DOJ and
the SEC that will help them translate their knowledge into
practical applications. Their involvement in actual
institutional reform will stimulate further organizational
research, as well as give support to, and inspire, related
legal scholarship.
This kind of involvement of organizational scholars is
necessary in order to overcome resistance to the application
of organizational knowledge and research. Organizational
change based on this research is difficult now because
organizational practices have become embedded. 228 As one
of the most well-known organizational scholars recently
observed, organizational research has shown that many
current organizational practices are ineffective and in fact
make firms less profitable than they could be had the
research been followed and the practices modified. Asking
himself why firms had not adopted the better practices, the
scholar observed that, since these practices were based
upon assumptions about human conduct that were in
conflict with the self-interest model, executives could not
imagine implementing them, because they simply refused
to believe that people acted in any way other than in
accordance with the accepted model. 229 In a similar way, if
organizational scholars propose reforms to firms to address
organization and group factors that led to misconduct and
if, as is likely to be the case, they base their reforms on
perspectives on human thinking and conduct other than the
self-interest model, their proposals will undoubtedly
encounter resistance. Giving them an official role in the
reform and requiring monitors to use their suggestions
would help overcome the embedded resistance.

228. See Misangyi et al., supra note 68, at 757-58.
229. See Jeffrey Pfeffer, Human Resources from an OrganizationalBehavior
Perspective: Some ParadoxesExplained, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 128-30 (2007).
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CONCLUSION

This Article argued that laws dealing with business
associations do not adequately address the group and
organizational factors in misconduct by senior decisionmakers of public firms. The law essentially adopts a "bad
apple," rather than a "bad barrel," perspective: it considers
senior-level misconduct to be essentially an individual
matter, and group or organizational causes or factors to be
insignificant in it. This Article contends that this approach
contradicts the learning of those who study groups and
organizations, social psychologists and organizational
theorists. Since senior-level misconduct is often attributable
to group and organizational factors, a response that focuses
only upon punishing the individuals involved leaves
problematic
organizational
attitudes
and
practices
unaffected and makes misconduct likely to recur.
This Article first reviewed representative social
psychological and organizational literature to set forth an
understanding of its basic teachings about group and
organizational factors in and causes of misconduct by senior
decision-makers of public firms. It drew four lessons from
that review. First, social psychology and organizational
studies suggest that a group's mindset and organization's
culture can significantly contribute to misconduct by an
organization member. This lesson rests on the assumption
that an individual assumes a social identity, in a work
group and business organization, that orients his or her
thinking and conduct (including misconduct) in that setting.
Second, they emphasize the significance of the leader in
perpetuating and shaping a group's mindset and an
organization's culture and thus in checking or promoting
misconduct. Third, how the group or organization functions
clearly affects whether it contributes to, or restricts,
misconduct by its members. In particular, dissent or
"cognitive conflict" allows members to challenge attitudes or
actions that a member feels are improper and/or may
corrupt the group or organization. Fourth and finally, the
group and organization must be based upon social, ethical,
and legal foundations and cannot be sustainable if built
only or primarily upon the self-interest of its individual
members. The
view from social psychology and
organizational studies is that a group or organization built
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upon self-interest is simply prone to unethical and illegal
conduct.
This Article's targeted legal review revealed that, by
and large, group and organizational causes or factors are
given little attention in corporate law jurisprudence and in
securities law enforcement by the SEC and federal
prosecutors. Corporate law jurisprudence, the basis for
public firm governance, all but closed off its most promising
avenue of inquiry in the duty of good faith. Federal
securities laws reflect that disclosure is a group product,
and in their enforcement of these laws against
organizations the SEC recognizes the significance of an
organizational culture in senior-level misconduct. But the
SEC uses the threat of organizational liability primarily to
reach individual bad actors, particularly high-level
decision-makers, in the firm. Federal criminal prosecution
of business firms takes this approach to the extreme.
Prosecutorial
policies
on
charging
organizations,
themselves based on organizational sentencing guidelines,
are written with individual liability in mind, with the
reform of organizations as an afterthought. Once again, in
organizational parlance, the legal emphasis is on "bad
apples" rather than "bad barrels."
This Article argues that the current state of affairs in
corporate and securities law should be reformed to reflect
the group and organizational causes of and factors in senior
decision-maker misconduct. The basic argument is that,
unless the law recognizes the group and organizational
factors, organizational reform will be superficial and will
not address the culture and practices that contributed to
the misconduct, which will likely resurface in the
organization, despite any imposed reforms. After noting
that, for jurisprudential and institutional reasons, there is
little hope from future developments in Delaware corporate
law jurisprudence, this Article contends that the SEC could
highlight group and organizational factors in senior-level
misconduct in its enforcement actions, which could be a
forum to raise these issues as well as the kind of necessary
group and organizational reform to address the misconduct.
Since the SEC can pursue organizations in these actions, it
could place equal emphasis on organizational reform
through settlements or judgments as upon prosecuting
individual bad actors. Moreover, the SEC might even bring
the issue of organizational reform to the forefront in its
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market regulation activities, particularly in company
disclosure. This Article, however, acknowledges that the
SEC staff faces personal, social, and organizational
pressures that militate against this kind of reform.
This Article also argues that, while the perspective,
competence, and resources of federal prosecutors impede
reform,
organizational
criminal
liability must be
maintained because it is a societal acknowledgement that
social and organizational factors contribute to misconduct
and because it is one of the few tools that allow society,
through the prosecutors, to address group malfunctioning
and pathological organizational culture. It contends that
federal prosecutors should continue the current policy of
preferring deferred or non prosecution agreements to
organizational prosecution and conviction, but should give
more attention to organizational reform in them. The
recommendation is that, not only should they work together
with the SEC in designing these agreements, but social
psychologists and organizational theorists should be
enlisted in the reform, for example, by being retained as
consultants by corporate monitors. This Article concludes
by asserting that this kind of involvement of organizational
scholars is necessary in order to overcome resistance to the
application of organizational knowledge and research to the
problem of senior-level misconduct and thus to push the law
to go beyond the "bad apples" perspective. It has the added
benefit
of
encouraging
social
psychologists
and
organizational scholars to enter more visibly the policy
debates about the regulation of business and financial
firms.

